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This essay is dedicated to the American Philosopher Edwin Arthur 
Burtt (1892 – 1989) and his ground-braking doctoral thesis: “The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Modern (Physical) Science”, London 
1924, 1925 
“Newton, we are told, was the first great positivist”.(...) “With his 
work the era of great speculative systems ended, and a new day of 
exactitude and promise for man’s intellectual conquest of nature 
dawned. How, then, speak of him as a metaphysician”?(...) “The only 
way to avoid becoming a metaphysician is to say nothing”.(p. 223-
224)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
Contents 
1. Summary   4 
2. Nagarjuna  9 
3. Interpretation of MMK’s 25 chapters   31 
4. Discussion of Nagarjuna’s work   33 
5. The metaphysical foundations of quantum physics   34 
6. Conclusion   46 
Appendix 1 
Meanings of pratityasamutpada   48 
Appendix 2 
What is quantum  entanglement?   50 
Appendix 3 
A.N. Whitehead  51 
Appendix 4 
Albert Einstein 64 
7.Notes   65 
Bibliography  70 
9. Short CV of the author  72 
5 
 
 
1.Summary 
The key terms. 
1. Key term: ‘Sunyata’. Nagarjuna is known in the history of Buddhism 
mainly by his keyword ‘sunyata’. This word is translated into English by 
the word ‘emptiness’. The translation and the traditional interpretations 
create the impression that Nagarjuna declares the objects as empty or 
illusionary or not real or not existing. What is the assertion and concrete 
statement made by this interpretation? That nothing can be found, that 
there is nothing, that nothing exists? Was Nagarjuna denying the 
external world? Did he wish to refute that which evidently is? Did he 
want to call into question the world in which we live? Did he wish to deny 
the presence of things that somehow arise?  My first point is the 
refutation of this traditional translation and interpretation. 
2. Key terms: ‘Dependence’ or ‘relational view’. My second point consists in 
a transcription of the keyword of ‘sunyata’ by the word ‘dependence’. 
This is something that Nagarjuna himself has done. Now Nagarjuna’s 
central view can be named ‘dependence of things’. Nagarjuna is not 
looking for a material or immaterial object which can be declared as a 
fundamental reality of this world.  His fundamental reality is not an 
object. It is a relation between objects.  This is a relational view of 
reality. This is the heart of Nagarjuna’s ideas. In the 19th century a more 
or less unknown Italian philosopher, Vincenzo Goberti, spoke about 
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relations as the mean and as bonds between things. Later, in quantum 
physics and in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead we are talking 
about interactions and entanglements. These ideas of relatedness or 
connections or entanglements in Eastern and Western modes of thought 
are the main idea of this essay.  
Not all entanglements are known. Just two examples: the nature of 
quantum entanglements is not known. Quantum entanglements should be 
faster than light. That's why Albert Einstein had some doubts. A second 
example: the completely unknown connections between the mind and the 
brain. Other examples are mysterious like the connections between birds 
in a flock. Some are a little known like gravitational forces.  
3. Key terms: ‘Arm in arm’. But Nagarjuna did not stop there. He was not 
content to repeat this discovery of relational reality. He went on one 
step further indicating that what is happening between two things. He 
gave indications to the space between two things. He realized that not 
the behaviour of bodies, but the behaviour of something between them 
may be essential for understanding the reality. This open space is not at 
all empty. It is full of energy. The open space is the middle between 
things. Things are going arm in arm. The middle might be considered as a 
force that bounds men to the world and it might be seen as well as a 
force of liberation. It might be seen as a bondage to the infinite space. 
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4. Key term: Philosophy. Nagarjuna, we are told, was a Buddhist 
philosopher. This statement is not wrong when we take the notion 
‘philosophy’ in a deep sense as a love to wisdom, not as wisdom itself. 
Philosophy is a way to wisdom. Where this way has an end wisdom begins 
and philosophy is no more necessary. A.N. Whitehead gives philosophy the 
commission of descriptive generalization. We do not need necessarily a 
philosophical building of universal dimensions. Some steps of descriptive 
generalization might be enough in order to see and understand reality. 
There is another criterion of Nagarjuna’s philosophy. Not his 
keywords ‘sunyata’ and ‘pratityasamutpada’ but his 25 philosophical 
examples are the heart of his philosophy. His examples are images. They 
do not speak to rational and conceptual understanding. They speak to our 
eyes. Images, metaphors, allegories or symbolic examples have a 
freshness which rational ideas do not possess. Buddhist dharma and 
philosophy is a philosophy of allegories. This kind of philosophy is not 
completely new and unknown to European philosophy. Since Plato’s 
allegory of the cave it is already a little known. (Plato 424 – 348 Before 
Current Era) The German philosopher Hans Blumenberg has underlined 
the importance of metaphors in European philosophy. 
5. Key terms: Quantum Physics. Why quantum physics? European modes 
of thought had no idea of the space between two this. They were bound 
to the ideas of substance or subject, two main metaphysical traditions of 
European philosophical history, two main principles. These substances and 
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these subjects are two immaterial bodies which were considered by 
traditional European metaphysics as lying, as a sort of core, inside the 
objects or underlying the empirical reality of our world. The first 
European scientist who saw with his inner eye the forces between two 
things had been Michael Faraday (1791-1867). Faraday was an English 
scientist who contributed to the fields of electromagnetism. Later 
physicists like Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, Erwin Schrödinger, Werner 
Heisenberg and others followed his view in modern physics. This is a fifth 
point of my work. I compare Nagarjuna with European scientific modes of 
thought for a better understanding of Asia. I do not compare Nagarjuna 
with European philosophers like Hegel, Heidegger, Wittgenstein. The 
principles and metaphysical foundations of physical sciences are more 
representative for European modes of thought than the ideas of Hegel, 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein and they are more precise. And slowly we 
are beginning to understand these principles. 
Let me take as an example the interpretation of quantum entanglement 
by the British mathematician Roger Penrose. Penrose discusses in the 
year of 2000 the experiences of quantum entanglement where light is 
separated over a distance of 100 kilometers and still remains connected 
in an unknown way. These are well known experiments in the last 30 
years. Very strange for European modes of thought. The light should be 
either separated or connected. That is the expectation most European 
modes of thought tell us. Aristotle had been the first. Aristotle (384  - 
9 
 
 
322 Before Current Era) was a Greek philosopher, a student of Plato and 
a teacher of Alexander the Great. He told us the following principle as a 
metaphysical foundation: Either a situation exists or not. There is not a 
third possibility. Now listen to Roger Penrose: 
“Quantum entanglement is a very strange type of thing. It is somewhere 
between objects being separate and being in communication with each 
other” (Roger Penrose, The Large, the Small and the Human Mind, 
Cambridge University Press. 2000 page 66). This sentence of Roger 
Penrose is a first step of a philosophical generalization in 
a  Whiteheadian sense. 
6. Key terms: ‘The metaphysical foundations of modern science’ had been 
examined particularly by three European and American philosophers: E. A. 
Burtt, A.N. Whitehead and Hans-Georg Gadamer, by Gadamer eminently 
in his late writings on Heraclitus and Parmenides. I try to follow the 
approaches of these philosophers of relational views and of anti-
substantialism. By ‘metaphysical foundations’ Edwin Arthur Burtt does 
not understand transcendental ideas but simply the principles that are 
underlying sciences. 
 
7. Key terms: ‘Complementarity’, ‘interactions’, ‘entanglements’.  Since 
1927 quantum physics has three key terms which give an indication to the 
fundamental physical reality: Complementarity, interactions and 
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entanglement. These three notions are akin to Nagarjuna’s relational view 
of reality. They are akin and they are very precise, so that Buddhism 
might learn something from these descriptions and quantum physicists 
might learn from Nagarjuna’s examples and views of reality. They might 
learn to do a first step in a philosophical generalisation of quantum 
physical experiments. All of us we might learn how objects are entangled 
or going arm in arm. [The end of the summary.]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
2. Nagarjuna 
 
Preliminary note 
 
We should be cautious about hastily translating the Sanskrit terms 
‘pratityasamutpada’ and ‘sunyata’ before having understood the full 
spectrum of their meaning. Rather than dealing with the abstract term 
‘pratityasamutpada’ and sunyata’, this essay will work with the images 
which Nagarjuna used to illustrate his concepts. The images are 
evidences of relations, intervals and intermediate states. [1] 
 
Nagarjuna's view of reality.  
 
Nagarjuna was the most significant Buddhist philosopher of China/India. 
He was the founder of the Middle Way School, Madhyamaka, which is of 
great topical interest because it became fundamental to all later 
Buddhist scholarly thought, known as Mahayana (Great Vehicle). It is a 
path of inner liberation which avoids the extreme views of substantialism 
and subjectivism. Nagarjuna's life is more or less known but apart from 
various unconfirmed legends, we have no assured biographical knowledge 
of Nagarjuna. The authenticity of thirteen of his works has been more or 
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less established by research. The Danish scholar Lindtner has examined 
and translated these works into English. Nagarjuna's main work, 
Mulamadhyamaka-karika (MMK) has been translated into several 
European languages [2]  In the MMK the Middle Way is described as: 
“What arises dependently (pratityasamutpada) is pronounced to be 
substancelessness (sunyata). This is nothing but a dependent concept 
(prajnapti). Substancelessness (sunyata) constitutes the middle way”. 
[MMK: chapter 24, verse 18] Nagarjuna's view consists principally of two 
aspects. The first is an exposition of his view of reality (sunyata, 
pratityasamutpada), according to which reality has no firm core and does 
not consist of independent, substantial components. Reality is rather a 
system of two-bodies or many bodies which reciprocally affect each 
other [3]. This view of reality is diametrically opposed to another key 
concept: ‘svabhava’, ‘own being’ or ‘inherent existence’, also known in the 
Greek tradition as ‘substance’. 
The second aspect of  Nagarjuna’s philosophy is an answer to the inner 
contradictions of four extreme modes of thought which can be subsumed 
under the headings: ‘substantialism’, ‘subjectivism’, ‘holism’ and 
‘instrumentalism’. My thesis is that these four modes of thought are 
unsustainable. 
 
(1) Substantialism  
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Substance (or own being) is defined as something that has independent 
existence. [4] Substantialism is at the centre of traditional metaphysics, 
beginning with pre-Socratic philosophers, for example Parmenides and 
Heraclitus, who were two critics of substantial thought, and going right 
up to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Substance is considered to exist by 
itself, i.e. the unchangeable, eternal and underlying basis for the entire 
non-material foundation of the world in which we live. Plato (4th century 
BCE) made a distinction between two forms of being in his Parmenides: on 
the one hand, singular objects which exist exclusively through 
participation without own being and, on the other hand, ideas that do 
have own being. Traditional metaphysics adopted Plato’s dualism. An 
independent own being is characterised as something that, as an existing 
thing is not dependent on anything else (Descartes); is existing by itself 
and subsisting through itself (More); is completely unlimited by others 
and free from any kind of foreign command (Spinoza); and exists of 
itself without anything else (Schelling).  The highest substance was often 
understood as God.  
Since Kant's ‘Copernican Revolution’ the primary question of philosophy 
has no longer been to comprehend reality, but rather to fathom the mind, 
i.e. the source of perception and knowledge. 
For this reason traditional metaphysics has lost ground in the modern 
world. In fact its central concepts, such as ‘substance’, ‘reality’, ‘essence’ 
and ‘being’ have been replaced by the reductionist modes of thought of 
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modern science.  Now ‘atoms’, ‘elementary particles’, ‘energy’, ‘fields of 
force’ and other concepts derived from the ‘laws of nature’ are viewed as 
the fundamental ground. 
(2) Subjectivism  
 Subjectivism is the philosophical theory that all knowledge is subjective, 
and relative. According to René Descartes (1596-1650) consciousness is 
primarily existent and everything else is sheer content or form, a 
creation of consciousness. The summit of subjectivism is the idealism of 
George Berkeley (1685-1753). The subjectivism of Immanuel Kant can be 
considered as moderated idealism. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) 
emphasises that subjectivity i.e. self-awareness has become the fulcrum 
of modern philosophical thought which provides us with evidential proof 
and certainty. This view has been continually brought into doubt by 
modern physical science. However, these doubts have not led to a new 
view of reality but to a fatal separation of philosophy and the sciences. 
This separation has exacerbated the dualism that preoccupies modern 
thought. Accordingly, the physicist P.C.W. Davies, expounds in his 1986 
book that electrons, photons or atoms do not exist; they are nothing but 
models of thought. [5] 
 
(3) Holism  
15 
 
 
The third approach avoids the fatal either-or dichotomy of the first 
two approaches by merging subject and object into one entity, such 
that there are no longer any separate parts but only one identity: all is 
one. Holism is “the view that an organic or integrated whole has a 
reality independent of and greater than the sum of its parts”[6]. 
‘Wholeness’ is made absolute, is mystified and becomes an independent 
unity that exists without dependence on its parts. Wholeness is 
understood as something concrete as if it was a matter of fact or an 
object of experience. As a philosophical approach found in great 
periods of European history of philosophy, this view is connected with 
names like Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), Leibniz (1646-1716) and 
Schelling (1775-1854).  In quantum physics, holism is represented by 
David Bohm. His key concept is ‘holomovement’, an undivided wholeness 
in flowing movement. [7] 
 
(4) Instrumentalism  
Instead of favoring subject or object or the two together, the fourth 
approach ignores the existence of the three. According to this viewpoint 
the search for reality is insignificant and meaningless. Instrumentalism is 
quite modern, intelligent (see the philosophy of Ernst Cassierer) and 
sometimes hair-splitting and hypercritical. It is difficult to disengage 
from it. It is an extension of subjectivism and it regards the process of 
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thinking as model making and as working with information, without 
concern as to what phenomena the information is about. What 
philosopher Donald Davidson (1917-2003) said about subjectivism, might 
be true for instrumentalism also: “Once one makes the decision for the 
Cartesian approach, it seems that one is unable to indicate what one’s 
proofs are evidence for”. [8]  
For instrumentalism, theories are not a description of the world but an 
instrument for a systematic classification and explanation of 
observations, and for the prediction of facts. 
The instrumentalist approach is outlined by the experimental physicist 
Anton Zeilinger who stated in an interview, “In classical physics we speak 
of a world of things that exists somewhere outside and we describe their 
nature. In quantum physics we have learned that we have to be very 
careful about this. Ultimately physical sciences are not sciences of 
nature but sciences of statements about nature. Nature in itself is 
always a construction of mind. Niels Bohr once put it like this: ‘There is 
no world of quantum, there is only a quantum  mechanical description’”. [9]  
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Nagarjuna’s viewpoint. 
 
Nagarjuna presents these four extreme views of reality in a scheme that 
is called in Sanskrit: ‘catuskoti’, the equivalent of the Ancient Greek 
‘tetralemma’, as follows: things have no substance: 1. neither out of 
themselves, 2. nor out of something else, 3. nor out of both, 4. nor 
without a cause. (tetralemma: a figure in Ancient Greek and Eastern logic 
with four possibilities.)  This kind of tetralemma refutes the four 
modern views of reality as above mentioned. This shows that Nagarjuna 
does not fall into any of these extremes and that his view is completely 
up-to-date. In the very first verse of the MMK a tetralemma is pointed 
out: “Neither from itself nor from another, nor from both, nor without a 
cause, does anything whatever anywhere arise”. [10] This verse can be 
understood as the principal statement of the MMK: the refutation of the 
four extreme metaphysical views which cannot be reconciled with the 
dependent arising of things. If this is the case, the remainder of the 
MMK would be a clarification of this verse. This requires careful 
examination. What is the assertion made by this verse? That nothing can 
be found, that there is nothing, that nothing exists? Was Nagarjuna 
denying the external world? Did he wish to refute what evidently is? Did 
he want to call into question the world in which we live? Did he wish to 
deny the everywhere presence of things that somehow arise? If ‘to arise’ 
refers to the empirical data, then we are obliged to argue that if a thing 
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does not arise out of itself, it must arise out of something else. So we 
should ask: what is the significance of the notion ‘to arise’?  In another 
text, Nagarjuna gives some indications how to understand this view. He 
writes in his Yuktisastika (YS):  
19. “That which has arisen dependently on this and that that has not 
arisen substantially (svabhavatah). What has not arisen substantially, how 
can it literally (nama) be called 'arisen'? […] That which originates due to 
a cause and does not abide without (certain) conditions but disappears 
when the conditions are absent, how can it be understood as 'to exist'? 
[11]  
 
By the notions of ‘to arise’ and ‘to exist’, Nagarjuna does not mean the 
empirical existence but the substantial existence, as we will see in the 
following examples. When in many passages of MMK Nagarjuna states 
that things do not arise (MMK 7.29), that they do not exist (MMK 3.7, 
5.8, 14.6), that they are not to be found (MMK 2.25, 9.11), that they are 
not (MMK 15.10), that they are unreal (MMK 13.1), then clearly this has 
the meaning: things do not arise substantially.  They do not exist out of 
themselves; their independence cannot be found. They are dependent and 
in this sense they are substantially unreal. Nagarjuna only rejects the 
idea of a substantial arising of things which bear an absolute and 
independent existence. He does not refute the empirical existence of 
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things as explained in the following: “It exists implies grasping after 
eternity.  It does not exist implies the philosophy of annihilation. 
Therefore, a discerning person should not decide on either existence or 
non-existence”. (MMK 15.10) 
 
For Nagarjuna, the expression ‘to exist’ has the meaning of ‘to exist 
substantially’. His issue is not the empirical existence of things but the 
conception of a permanent thing i.e. the idea of an own being, without 
dependence on something else. Nagarjuna refutes the concept of 
independent existence which is unchangeable, eternal and existing by 
itself.  Things do not arise out of themselves, they do not exist 
absolutely and are dependent. Their permanent being or existence cannot 
be found.  The many interpretations of Nagarjuna which claim that he is 
also refuting the empirical existence of objects, are making an 
inadmissible generalization which moves Nagarjuna near to subjectivism, 
nihilism and instrumentalism.  Such interpretations originate in 
metaphysical approaches which themselves have a difficulty in 
recognizing the empirical existence of the data presented. This is not at 
all the case with Nagarjuna. Nagarjuna presents the dependence of 
phenomena mainly in images as in the twenty-five chapters of the MMK. 
[12] 
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A brief review of the 25 chapters of the Mulamadhyamaka-karika 
(MMK): 
 
1. A thing and its cause; 2. A mover and the distance to be moved;  
3. A seer and a vision or view; 4. A cause and its effect; 5. A 
characteristic and its characterization; 6. Desire and the desirous 
one; 7. Origination, duration and decay; 8. Action and agent; 9. A 
viewer and a vision; 10. Fire and fuel; 11. Birth and death; 12. 
Suffering and the causes of suffering; 13. A teenager and an aged 
person; 14. Something and a different thing; 15. Being and nothing; 
16. Bondage and liberation; 17. Action and its fruit ; 18. Identity 
and difference; 19. The past, the present and the future; 20. Cause 
and effect; 21. Coming to be and passing away; 22. The Buddha 
exists and the Buddha does not exist after death; 23. Pure and 
impure; 24. Buddha and bodhi; 25. Nirvana and being. 
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Chapter 1: Cause and effect. 
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Chapter 1: Cause and effect. A high speed photograph by Harold E. 
Edgerton. 
Picture: http://canibuk.wordpress.com/2011/11/16/harold-edgerton/  
Commentary: A projectile after penetrating an apple. The penetration of 
the projectile is the cause of the direct effect: the beginning of an 
explosion of the apple. This happens at the same moment. Cause and 
effect cannot be separated. They are not one object and they are not 
two separated objects. There is no space and no time between cause and 
object. The cause leads immediately to a near effect. There is not first 
a cause and later an effect. The most important characteristic of bodies 
is their interdependence and the resultant, substancelessness, the 
impossibility of existing individually and independently. A thing is not 
independent of its cause and conditions, nor is it identical with them. 
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Chapter 2: A mover and the distance within which to move. Usain 
Bolt. 2012. Picture: Reuters. A thing is not independent of its conditions, 
nor is it identical with them. A mover does not exist without the distance 
within which to move. The mover and the distance are not one. A mover 
and the distance are neither together nor separated. The most important 
characteristic of bodies is their interdependence and the resultant, 
substancelessness, the impossibility of existing individually and 
independently. 
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Chapter 8. Action and agent. Picture: Allsport. Description: Cassius 
Clay (Muhammad Ali) lands a right on Brian London during their 
Heavyweight World Title Fight at Earls Court, London. Commentary: 
When there is no action there is no agent, neither exists per se. Action 
and agent are not isolated components; they arise only by their 
dependence on other bodies. Not the behaviour of bodies but the 
behaviour of something between them is essential. 
25 
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Chapter 10: Fire and fuel. Photographer unknown.  
The meaning of fuel is here: an already burning material.  
Commentary: Without fire there can be nothing designated as fuel in the 
sense of a burning material. The material or immaterial components of a 
two-body or three-body system do not exist in isolation, they are not one 
and yet they are not independent of each other. Something is happening 
between these bodies and because of this, they are not substantially 
real. Nagarjuna emphasises one central idea: bodies are neither together 
nor separated. The most important characteristic of bodies is their 
interdependence and the resultant, substancelessness, the impossibility 
of an independent and individual existence. 
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Chapter 12: Suffering and the causes of suffering. Picture: Kevin 
Carter. hunger1_kevin.carter. Commentary: Suffering is not independent 
from a cause of suffering and not identical with its cause. There can be 
no cause without an effect, or an effect without a cause. The notion 
‘cause’ has no meaning without the notion ‘effect’. Cause and effect are 
not one, but they cannot be separated into two independent notions 
either. Like suffering reality does not consist of single, isolated material 
or immaterial components; suffering arises only by dependence on other 
causes. Like everything in this world suffering and its cause are not one 
and they are not two different objects. 
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Chapter 13. A teenager and an aged person. Mahatma Gandhi 
when he was a teenager and when he was an old man. These two 
men are not the same and they are not two different men. 
http://gandhi-
nhd.weebly.com/uploads/4/5/3/7/45373129/293620_orig.jpg 
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Chapter 13. A teenager and an aged person. 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 16: Bondage and liberation. 1945. Description: Prisoners of 
Dachau, at liberation cheering the liberating US soldiers: We are 
free…free… Picture: http://isurvived.org/TOC-III.html . Commentary: 
There is no liberation without bondage. For two complementary 
realities, bondage and liberation, the nature and the existence of each 
are dependent on the other. There is no fundamental core to reality; 
rather reality consists of systems of interacting facts or ideas.  
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Chapter 23. Pure and impure. Rio Negro and the Amazon meet in 
Manaus, Brazil. Picture: Markus Mauthe. http://www.wildview.de/tag/rio-
negro/. Commentary: Usually two waters get mixed when they come 
together. These two impure waters remain separated in the same river at 
the beginning of the Amazon. Only after 30 km they are completely 
mixed. The idea or notion ‘pure’ has no meaning without the opposite idea 
or notion ‘impure’. A fundamental or elementary or independent idea or 
notion does not exist. Our ideas or notions are dependent. One notion is 
contingent upon another. 
32 
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Father and son. Description: The author, his daughter Larissa (left) and 
his son Nikolai (right), Dec. 1980. Picture: C.T. Kohl. 
 “If the son is produced by the father, but the father also produced by 
that very son, then will you please tell me, which one is the true ‘cause’ 
and which the true ‘result’?” (Nagarjuna, Vigrahavyavartani.) 
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A solar storm. Something is happening between sun and earth. 
Picture: http://www.picalls.com/data/media/17/Solar_storm_1.jpg 
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3. Interpretation of MMK’s 25 chapters. 
 
In 25 out of 27 chapters, Nagarjuna emphasizes one central idea: bodies 
are neither together nor separated. The most important characteristic 
of bodies is their interdependence and the resultant, substancelessness, 
the impossibility of existing individually and independently. This is the 
meaning of pratityasamutpada and sunyata: bodies are without own being 
and are not independent of each other. Reality does not consist of single, 
isolated material or immaterial components. It is not the behaviour of 
independent bodies but the behaviour of something between them that is 
essential. 
 
Let us concentrate on the 25 chapters: a thing is not independent of 
its conditions, nor is it identical with them. A mover does not exist 
without the distance within which to move. The mover and the distance 
are not one. A viewer is not the same as the view, but a viewer without a 
view does not exist. There can be no cause without an effect, or an 
effect without a cause. The notion ‘cause’ has no meaning without the 
notion ‘effect’. Cause and effect are not one, but they cannot be 
separated into two independent notions either. Without a characteristic, 
we cannot speak of a characterization, and the other way round. How 
could there be a desirous one without desire?  When there is no action 
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there is no agent, neither exists per se. Without fire there can be 
nothing designated as fuel. The material or immaterial components of a 
two-body or three-body system do not exist in isolation, they are not one 
and yet they are not independent of each other. Something is happening 
between these bodies and because of this they are not substantially real. 
For two or sometimes three complementary bodies or for two concepts 
like cause and effect, or bondage and liberation, the nature and the 
existence of each are dependent on the other. The one arises with the 
other and disappears with the other. This is why a thing arises 
substantially, neither out of itself, nor out of another, nor out of both, 
nor without a cause. There is no fundamental core to reality; rather 
reality consists of systems of interacting bodies. This view of reality is 
first and foremost an idea; a pointer to reality which cannot be 
described in words. One who can speak about concept-free reality has 
not experienced it. For the Buddhist tradition based on Nagarjuna, the 
yogic experience of substancelessness, the experience of dependent 
arising, the direct perception of reality as it is, all presuppose a high 
level of spiritual realisation which entails the abandonment of extreme 
views and the demolition of the entire edifice of dualistic thought and 
philosophy. To experience pratityasamutpada or sunyata means to become 
free of all entanglements of this world. Nirvana is simply another 
expression for this. 
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4. Discussion of Nagarjuna’s work. 
 
For Nagarjuna, the primary question was not about mind, nor about the 
origin of knowledge but about the reality of the physical world. Tarab 
Tulku Rinpoche presented an all-encompassing position when he said,  
“everything existing partakes in a fundamental 'mind-field', which is the 
basic 'substance' from which mind in a more individual way and the 
individual body develop”. [13] In order to emphasise that Nagarjuna does 
not only speak about views without substance but also about bodies 
without substance, here is a comparison with the views of reality 
suggested by quantum physicists. Physics is about views and the 
conditions of physical reality. It creates models and thus examines only 
realities which have been posited by physics itself. Nevertheless, as the 
experimental psychologist Irvin Rock who studied visual perception, 
describes it, we should not go so far as to consider all our perceptions 
and thought models to be purely adventitious. While the constructions of 
our mind are not identical with reality, they are not purely coincidental 
and usually not deceptive. [14] Behind these models are empirical bodies 
and there is some approximation of a structural similarity between a 
physical model and the corresponding physical and tangible reality. 
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5. The metaphysical foundations of quantum physics 
 
“A courageous scientific imagination was needed to realize fully that 
not the behaviour  of bodies, but the behaviour of something 
between them, that is, the field, may be essential for ordering and 
understanding events” [...] “What impresses our senses as matter is 
really a great concentration of energy into a comparatively small 
space”  Albert Einstein.[15] 
 
This is not a presentation or criticism of quantum physics but a 
discussion of the metaphysical mindsets and principles which underlie 
quantum physics. The views of reality in quantum physics can be 
expressed by three key terms: ‘complementarity’, ‘four interactions’ and 
‘entanglement’. [16] 
In the prehistory of quantum physics it could not be proved 
experimentally whether the smallest elements of light were particles or 
waves. Many experiments argued in favour of one or the other 
assumption. Electrons and photons sometimes act like waves and 
sometimes like particles. This ‘behaviour’ was named: wave-particle 
dualism. The idea of dualism was therein understood to be a logical 
contradiction, in the sense that only one or the other could actually 
apply; but paradoxically both appeared.  
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According to this understanding of atomic theory, electrons and photons 
cannot be both particles and waves. According to atomic theory, a 
scientific explanation consists of a reduction of a variable factor into its 
permanent components and their applicable mathematical laws. This is the 
fundamental dualistic view that modern atomic theory has inherited from 
the natural philosophy of the ancient Greeks who expounded that 
substance and permanence cannot be found in objects of perception of 
the world in which we live, but can be found in the fundamental elements 
making up objects and their mathematical order. These material and 
immaterial foundations hold the world together, they do not change, 
although everything else changes. According to the expectation of atomic 
theory, it should be possible to reduce an object to its independent 
elements, to its mathematical laws, or to its simple and fundamental 
principles. Until 1927 the fundamental elements had to be either 
particles or waves, they could not be both. What is to be understood by 
independent elements? As mentioned before, the notion of substance 
refers to something that has independent existence. 
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Albert Einstein’s contribution to the interpretation of quantum 
physics 
 
Albert Einstein was following the aforementioned metaphysical tradition 
when he wrote in the year of 1948 very clearly: 
 
“For the classification of things that are introduced in physics, it is 
essential that these things have for a certain time an independent 
existence from each other, in so far as these things lie 'in different 
parts of space'. Without the assumption of such an independent 
existence [Einstein uses the German term So-sein, this is akin to 
terms like substance, or being, or suchness] of things which, in terms 
of ordinary thought, are spatially distant from each other, physical 
thought in the usual sense would not be possible”. [17]  
 
This idea of an independent reality was projected onto the basic element 
of the world of matter by atomic theory. For atomic theory, a scientific 
explanation means to reduce the variability and variety of objects and 
conditions to their permanent, stable, independent, and indivisible 
elements and to their conformity with mathematical laws. According to 
the expectations of atomic theory, all variations in nature can be 
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explained in terms of separation, association and movements of 
unchanging, independent atoms or still more elementary particles.  These 
particles and their conformity to mathematical laws constitute the core 
of bodies.  They underlie everything and hold the world together. The 
question whether the fundamental objects are waves or particles was an 
explosive issue: at stake were the traditional metaphysical views of 
reality available to quantum physics.  
 
It became evident that fundamental reality could not be grasped by 
traditional views of reality. What is the explanatory value of atomic 
theory if it becomes clear that there are no independent, stable atoms 
or elementary particles, and that objects have no stable core? Are these 
quantum objects objective, subjective, both or neither? What is reality? 
Is the quantum world completely distinct from the world in which we 
live? 
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Niels Bohr’s contribution to the interpretation of quantum physics 
 
 In 1927, the physicist Niels Bohr introduced the idea of 
complementarity into quantum physics. According to this idea, the wave 
form and the particle form are not two separate forms which contradict 
and exclude each other but are mutually complementary forms which can 
provide a complete description of physical manifestations only together.  
According to Niels Bohr, complementarity means that in the quantum 
world it is impossible to speak about independent quantum objects 
because they are in an interactive relationship with each other as well as 
with the instrument of measurement.  He emphasized that this 
interaction between the quantum object and the instrument of 
measurement was an inseparable element of quantum objects, because it 
plays a major part in the development of several features of them. 
Certain measurements establish electrons or photons as particles and 
destroy the interference that distinguishes the object as a wave. Other 
measurements establish the object as a wave. This was Niels Bohr's new 
idea of reality.  
 
From the insight that the quantum object and the instrument of 
measurement could not be separated, Niels Bohr did not conclude that 
there are no quantum objects. At least he did not do so when he was 
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arguing in terms of physics. When he spoke about the metaphysics of 
quantum physics he took an instrumentalist approach. [18] For the 
physicist Niels Bohr, quantum physical objects consist of interacting 
and complementary quantum objects. 
44 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
 
The double-slit experiment. (see previous page) If you send an atom of 
helium through a double-slit, every atom produces a point behind the 
double-slit. The atoms arrive in discrete lumps. There is no interference 
in the beginning. The atoms arrive like bullets at the screen. But later 
they show interference. Their appearance shows the structure of waves 
in a similar manner to waves on water. The seven pictures shown were 
taken at intervals ranging from 5 minutes to 42 hours and 18 minutes. 
Quantum objects show a double quality of particles and of waves. They 
are dependent on the instrument of measurement: the double-slit. This 
double quality has been named ‘complementarity’ by Niels Bohr. 
Complementarity means that the two qualities are not dualistic.  They do 
not exclude each other but complement each other like the poles of a 
dipole. Picture: Haken, H./ Wolf, H.C., Atom- und Quantenphysik. 
Springer Verlag Berlin 2000. With the permission of Springer Verlag. 
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Dipole. Picture: Quelle: leifi.physik.uni-
muenchen.de/web_ph07_g8/umwe...  
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Figure 1: In this Feynman diagram, an electron and a positron annihilate 
each other, producing a photon (represented by the blue sine wave) that 
becomes a quark/anti-quark pair. The photon is or represents or creates 
or realises the electromagnetic interaction or electromagnetic force. 
Picture: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feynman_diagram 
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The concepts of interactions in the standard model of quantum 
physics. 
 
The notion of four elementary interactions was introduced in the 
standard model of quantum physics. These four forces obstruct the 
reduction of quantum objects into independent objects. Such an idea had 
already been posited by Democritus in the 3rd century BCE. The 
interactional forces which operate between the quantum objects, are 
added to the quantum objects. Instead of singular, independent objects, 
two-body systems or many-body systems were established as the base of 
matter. Between the bodies, interacting forces are effective in keeping 
them together. [19] 
These interactions are a composite of the bodies. Mostly they are forces 
of attraction and in the case of electro-magnetic forces they can also be 
forces of repulsion.   One visualises the interaction between the 
elementary particles as an interaction of elementary particles. The 
physicist Steven Weinberg puts it like this: “At the present moment the 
closest we can come to a unified view of nature is a description in terms 
of elementary particles and their mutual interactions. [...] The most 
familiar are gravitation and electromagnetism, which, because of their 
long range, are experienced in the everyday world. Gravity holds our feet 
on the ground and the planets in their orbits. Electromagnetic 
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interactions of electrons and atomic nuclei are responsible for all the 
familiar chemical and physical properties of ordinary solids, liquids and 
gases. Next, both in range and familiarity, are the 'strong' interactions, 
which hold protons and neutrons together in the atomic nucleus. The 
strong forces are limited in range to about 10-13 centimeter and so are 
quite insignificant in ordinary life, or even in the scale (10-8 centimeter) 
of the atom. Least familiar are the 'weak' interactions. They are of such 
short range (less than 10-15 centimeter) and are so weak that they do not 
seem to play a role in holding anything together”. [20] 
 
In this respect, the explanations enter into quite difficult and subtle 
particulars. How, for example, can an electron which consists only of one 
particle be in interaction with another quantum object? What part of 
itself can it emit if it consists only of one particle? These questions can 
be answered by the concept of interaction. In fact an electron does not 
exist of only a single particle exactly because the interaction of the 
electron is a part of it. In 1978 The physicists Daniel Z. Freedman and 
Pieter van Nieuwenhuizen wrote in this regard that “the observed 
electron mass is the sum of the 'bare mass' and the 'self-energy' 
resulting from the interaction of the electron with its own 
electromagnetic field. Only the sum of the two terms is observable”. [21] 
What in quantum physics is known about interactions is here summarized 
in the words of the physicist and Nobel prize laureate Gerard 't Hooft: 
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“An electron is surrounded by a cloud of virtual particles, which it 
continually emits and absorbs. This cloud does not consist of photons 
only, but also of pairs of charged particles, for example electrons and 
their anti-particles, the positrons. […] Even a quark is surrounded by a 
cloud of gluons and pairs of quark and anti-quark”. [22] 
 
Singular, isolated, independent quarks, a phenomenon which is called 
‘confinement’ in recent research, have never been observed. Quarks are 
captives, they cannot appear on their own but only as one of a pair or as 
one of a trio.  When you try to separate two quarks by force, new quarks 
will appear between them which combine into pairs and trios.  Claudio 
Rebbi and other physicists have reported that, “between the quarks and 
gluons inside an elementary particle, additional quarks and gluons are 
continuously formed and after a short time again subside”. [23] These 
clouds of virtual particles represent or produce interactions. The central 
core of quantum physics consists of a new view of reality that no longer 
perceives singular, independent elements but rather two-body systems, 
two states of a quantum object or two concepts, e.g., earth/moon, 
proton/electron, proton/neutron, quark/anti-quark, wave/measuring 
instrument, particle/measuring instrument, twin photons, super-positions, 
spin-up/spin-down, matter/anti-matter, elementary particle/field of 
force, law of nature/matter, etcetera. These systems cannot be 
separated into independent parts, or reduced to two separate, 
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independent bodies or states, nor is one fundamental and the other 
derived, as the metaphysical either-or schemes of substantial 
materialism and subjectivism try to establish. They are not joined into a 
seamless unity either, they are not the same, they are not identical and 
they are not a mysterious wholeness as holism indicates. Finally, we 
cannot claim, as instrumentalists do, that they are nothing but 
mathematical models which we have constructed and which do not 
correspond to physical reality. In physics, there is a fundamental reality 
that is not a one-body system.  It is a two-body system or an assembly of 
bodies, a cloud of virtual particles which surround the central or 'naked' 
body.  Between these bodies is an interaction that is one of the 
composites of them. This understanding of physics cannot be dislodged 
and yet all our metaphysical schemata struggle against it. The cloud does 
not conform to our traditional expectations of what should delineate and 
underpin stability, substantiality and order.  How can clouds be what we 
are used to calling the basic elements of matter? How can this small 
vibrating something be what generations of philosophers and physicists 
have been searching for in order to arrive at the core of matter, the 
ultimate reality? Is this supposed to be it?  From these little clouds we 
attempt to use metaphysical interpretation to distill something that has 
substance and is enduring. Entirely within the sense of the substance 
metaphysics of Plato, Heisenberg (1901-1976) contends that the 
mathematical forms are the idea of elementary particles and that the 
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object of elementary particles corresponds with this mathematical idea. 
The physicist and philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (1912-2007) 
called mathematics 'the essence of nature'. According to the physicist 
Schopper, fields of force are the ultimate reality. [24] Some of us want 
to see reality as a mysterious whole (holism) or dismiss it as a 
construction without any correspondence to empirical reality 
(instrumentalism). All of this only because we do not find it easy to admit 
that the complex interactions of the world in which we live have their 
roots in a reality that is in itself complex.  
 
It is impossible to escape from the entanglement of this world in 
quantum physics and, to find an elementary quantum object that is not 
dependent on other quantum objects or on parts of itself. It is also 
impossible to dissolve the double-sided character of quantum objects. 
The fundamental reality of our physical world consists of clouds of 
interacting quantum objects. 
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6. Conclusion.  
 
It seems that reality is not static, solid or independent and does not 
consist of singular, isolated material or immaterial factors, but of 
systems of dependent bodies. Most systems consist of more than two 
bodies, but there is no system that consists of less than two bodies. In 
quantum physics we call such fundamental two-body systems: 
earth/moon, electron/positron, quark/anti-quark, particle/field, 
etcetera. Nagarjuna calls his systems or dependent pairs: 
mover/distance to move within, fire/fuel, agent/action, viewer/view, 
etcetera.  
 
Both, quantum physicists and Nagarjuna deal with two-body systems or 
two entities which have bodies that are neither properly separate, nor 
properly joined together. They do not unite into one, nor do they fall 
apart. These bodies are not independent and cannot be observed singly 
because in their very existence and constitution they are dependent on 
each other and cannot exist or function independently.  
 
They are entangled by interactions, even at a far distance. One of them 
cannot be reduced to the other and it is not possible to explain one of 
54 
 
 
them on the basis of the other. The resultant systems have a fragile 
stability, the components of which are maintained by interactions and 
mutual dependencies which are sometimes known, sometimes not fully 
known and sometimes totally unknown (for example as with entangled twin 
photons). 
 
What is reality? We have become accustomed to believe in a firm ground 
under our feet and fleeting clouds above in the sky. The view of reality in 
Nagarjuna's thought and the ideas of complementarity, interactions and 
entanglement of quantum physics teach us that everything is built on 
sand. Moreover, even the grains of sand are not endowed with a solid 
nucleus. Their stability is based on balancing unstable interactions of 
their components. 
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Appendix 1. 
Meanings of  pratityasamutpada.  
 
In the first place pratityasamutpada is an indication of dependence. 
Dependent bodies are in an intermediate state, they are not properly 
separated and they are not one entity. Secondly, they rely on each other 
and are influenced or determined by something else. Thirdly, their 
behaviour is influenced by something in-between, for example a mover is 
attracted by gravitational force, a viewer is dependent on rays of light 
between his eyes and the object, a piano player’s action is determined by 
the fine motor skills of his fingers, an agent is dependent on his act. 
Pratityasamutpada  is an indication of dependence and of something that 
happens between the objects. One object is bound to the other without 
being identical to it. The implicit interpretations of pratityasamutpada, 
are in terms of time, structure and space. 
The following citations and references illustrate the term 
pratityasamutpada. Pratityasamutpada is used: 
1. as Dependence in Nagarjuna’s Hymn to the Buddha: “ Dialecticians 
maintain that suffering is created by itself, created by (someone) 
else, created by both (or) without a cause, but You have stated that 
it is dependently born”. [25]  
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2. as an intermediate state by Nagarjuna: Objects are neither together 
nor separated (Nagarjuna, MMK 6. 10). 
3. as bondage in the Hevajra Tantra: “Men are bound by the bondage of 
existence and are liberated by understanding the nature of existence”. 
[26] 
4. as an intermediate state by Roger Penrose: “Quantum entanglement 
is a very strange type of thing. It is somewhere between objects 
being separate and being in communication with each other”. [27] 
5. as something between bodies by Albert Einstein: “A courageous 
scientific imagination was needed to realize fully that not the 
behaviour of bodies, but the behaviour of something between them, 
that is, the field, may be essential for ordering and understanding 
events”. [28] 
6. as the mean between things in modern mathematics:  to quote Gioberti 
again: “The mean between two or more things, their juncture, union, 
transit, passage, crossing, interval, distance, bond and contact – all these 
are mysterious, for they are rooted in the continuum, in the infinite. The 
interval that runs between one idea and another, one thing and another, 
is infinite, and can only be surpassed by the creative act.  
This is why the dynamic moment and dialectic concept of the mean are no 
less mysterious than those of the beginning and the end. The mean is a 
union of two diverse and opposite things in a unity. It is an essentially 
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dialectic concept, and involves an apparent contradiction, namely, the 
identity of the one and the many, of the same and the diverse. This unity 
is simple and composite; it is unity and synthesis and harmony. It shares 
in two extremes without being one or the other.  It is the continuum, and 
therefore the infinite. Now, the infinite identically uniting contraries, 
clarifies the nature of the interval. In motion, in time, in space, in 
concepts, the discrete is easy to grasp, because it is finite. The 
continuum and the interval are mysterious, because they are infinite”. 
[29] 
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Appendix 2. 
What is quantum entanglement? Two very short answers: 
According to Clegg: 
“Entanglement is a strange feature of quantum physics, the science of 
the very small. It’s possible to link together two quantum particles — 
photons of light or atoms, for example — in a special way that makes 
them effectively two parts of the same entity. You can then separate 
them as far as you like, and a change in one is instantly reflected in the 
other. This odd, faster than light link, is a fundamental aspect of 
quantum science. Schrödinger, who came up with the name ‘entanglement’ 
called it ‘the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics’. Entanglement is 
fascinating in its own right, but what makes it really special are dramatic 
practical applications that have become apparent in the last few years”. 
[30] 
According to Merali: 
“This weird quantum effect inextricably links two or more objects in such 
a way that measurements carried out on one immediately change the 
properties of its partners, no matter how far apart they are. Quantum 
effects, such as entanglement, are usually confined to the invisible 
microscopic world and are detected only indirectly using precision 
instruments”. [31] 
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Appendix 3:  
Alfred North Whitehead: Adventures of Ideas, The Free Press, New 
York 1933 
Chapter IX  
Science and Philosophy 
 
Whitehead's keywords: interconnectedness, relation, connectedness, 
continuous, derivation, essential interconnectedness, inclusive whole, 
betweenness, unity, togetherness, to mingle, a passage, together. 
 
[My comment: Some of Whitehead's keywords without any claim to 
completeness. These keywords denote not the behaviour of bodies, 
but the behaviour of something between them. The meaning and the 
idea of each keyword differ slightly from the other. In the English 
language many of Whitehead's keywords have slightly varying, though 
allied meanings from other keywords. We cannot summarize or 
combine or subsume them. We cannot pin them down to only one 
meaning or one idea. I show these keywords in the following context 
of two chapters.]  
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Section I. In one sense, Science and Philosophy are merely different 
aspects of one great enterprise of the human mind. We will dwell upon 
their cooperation in the task of raising humanity above the general level 
of animal life. At this low, animal level, flashes of aesthetic insight, of 
technological attainment, of sociological organization, of affectionate 
feeling, display themselves. Nightingales, beavers, ants, the kindly 
nurture of the young, all witness to the existence of this level of life in 
the animal world. Of course all these modes of functioning are carried to 
an immeasurably higher level among mankind. In human beings these 
various modes of functioning exhibit more variety of adaptation to 
special circumstances, they are more complex, and they are more 
interwoven with each other. But without question, among animals they are 
there, plainly demonstrated to our observation. 
 
Among living things on this planet, so far as direct evidence reaches, 
Science and Philosophy belong to men alone. They are both concerned 
with the understanding of individual facts as illustrations of general 
principles. The principles are understood in the abstract, and the facts 
are understood in respect to their embodiment of the principles. 
 
For example, animals seem quite familiar with the habit of bodies to fall 
down. They show no surprise at such occurrence, and they often knock 
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things over. But quite early in the history of modern European science we 
find Aristotle formulating the law that there is a tendency for material 
bodies to seek the centre of the Earth. This law was almost certainly not 
a discovery of Aristotle's. It was a reigning commonplace of Greek 
thought, although not accepted unanimously. But it is plainly set forth in 
his writings, and it is beside our point to indulge further in archaeological 
conjectures. This scientific law seems rather antiquated to us, and in 
fact not quite true. It is over special, and yet requires severe limitation 
before the quantitative measurements bear out its statements with any 
exactness. We shall find that the subsequent history of this law and of 
its successive modifications throw great light upon the relative functions 
of Science and Philosophy. 
 
But let us first examine Aristotle's Law, which is one of the earlier 
doctrines of that Western Science whose history stretches from Thales 
of Miletus, alive at the date 600 B.C., to the present day. Roughly 
speaking, it is a history of about twenty-five hundred years. Of course 
there were anticipations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, and China. But 
modern science, urged onward by the curiosity of the human spirit, 
permeated with criticism, and divorced from hereditary superstitions, 
had its birth with Greeks; and among the Greeks Thales was the earliest 
exponent known to us 
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In this general characterization science and philosophy are not 
discriminated. But the word ‘curiosity’ somewhat trivializes that inward 
motive which has driven men. In the greater sense, in which it is here 
used, ‘curiosity’ means the craving of reason that the facts discriminated 
in experience be understood. It means the refusal to be satisfied with 
the bare welter of fact, or even with the bare habit of routine. The first 
step in science and philosophy has been made when it is grasped that 
every routine exemplifies a principle which is capable of statement in 
abstraction from its particular exemplifications. We are American, or 
French, or English; and we love our modes of life, with their beauties and 
their tendernesses. But curiosity drives us to an attempt to define 
civilization; and in this generalization we soon find that we have lost our 
beloved America, our beloved France, and our beloved England. The 
generality stands with a cold impartiality, where our affections cling to 
one or the other of the particulars. 
 
An examination of Aristotle’s Law of Gravitation exemplifies this 
abstractive process inherent in science. The Law involves a classification 
of the things around us. There are the heavy bodies with the property of 
tending downwards, and there are the other elements such as flames, 
with the intrinsic nature that they tend upwards though they are 
component things on the Earth’s surface. These upward moving things 
tend to their proper place which is the heavens. The stars and planets 
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form yet a third class of things which by their own nature are in the 
heavens, things which are ingenerable and incorruptible. In this 
classification of the components of physical nature yet a fourth 
component remains over, in its character unique and thus the only 
member of its class. This component is the Earth, the center of the 
Universe, by reference to which all these other types of being are 
defined. 
In this classification of the various components of physical nature 
Aristotle has given to Science and Philosophy its first sweeping analysis 
of the fact of physical nature. You will notice that the classification 
proceeds entirely by reference to function, quite in the modern spirit. In 
the place of an uninterpreted swamp, pestilential with mystery and magic, 
he sets before our understanding a majestic, coordinated scheme, lucid 
to the understanding and based upon the obvious, persistent fact of our 
experience. In the generality of its scope, it is equally philosophic and 
scientific, and later on it provided the physical background for the 
Christian scheme of salvation. Its overthrow, eighteen hundred years 
later, was resisted equally by Luther and the Church of Rome. As an 
example of a majestic inductive generalization, appealing to the obvious 
facts, and neglecting the welter of minor differences, Aristotle’s general 
conception of the physical universe remains unsurpassed. For every 
feature in it, there is an appeal to observation; and for every observation 
to which appeal is made, there is the possibility of its indefinite 
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repletion. With Aristotle and Epicurus, the science of modern civilization 
reached adolescence. 
Section II. There is a clear-cut obviousness about Aristotle’s doctrines 
which is entirely lacking to Plato’s cosmology. Of course neither Plato, nor 
Aristotle, originated his own particular line of thought. There was a 
history behind them of three or four generations of thinkers, back to 
the dim figures of Thales and Pythagoras, and even beyond them. Also 
Aristotle worked for twenty years in the Academy of Plato, and derived 
ideas from that active, speculative group of thinkers, to whom the 
modern world owes its speculation, its criticism, its deductive and 
inductive sciences, and the civilization of its religious concepts. They 
were the narrow channel through which passed the confused traditions 
of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Syria, and of the sea-borne Greek civilization.  
From this Academy and its Aristotelian off-shoot, there emerged the 
various lines of thought which the subsequent schools of Alexandria 
turned into the first phase of modern science, natural and humane. 
Undoubtedly the world then lost picturesqueness. For prophets were 
superseded by professors. In other words, as the movement has 
penetrated into habits of thought, intuitive conviction has wilted in the 
face of criticism. But amid all the limitations of humanity, wandering 
dazed in the abundant universe, knowledge has reconditioned human life, 
and has made possible that virtue which requires such measure of 
intellectual analysis. 
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Between them, Plato and Aristotle succeed in illustrating the chief 
connections between science and philosophy. The emphasis of science is 
upon observation of particular occurences, and upon inductive 
generalization, issuing in wide classifications of things according to their 
modes of functioning, in other words according to the laws of nature 
which they illustrate. The emphasis of philosophy is upon generalizations 
which almost fail to classify by reason of their universal application. For 
example, all things are involved in the creative advance of the Universe, 
that is, in the general temporality which affects all things, even if at all 
times they remain self-identical. Thus the consideration of weight led 
Aristotle to his four-fold classification. 
 
Now Plato had already emphasized the importance of this Aristotelian 
notion of classification, that is to say, of 'division' as he called it. 
Perhaps indeed he invented the method. It would have been quite in 
accordance with his clear-cut intellectual subtlety to have done so. We 
find in his dialogues the first explicit formulations of the science of 
Logic. But his applications of the method are feeble in the extreme, from 
the point of view of the advancement of natural science. Whereas 
Aristotle in his life's work seized upon the general notion of 
classification, he gave a masterly analysis of the complexities inherent in 
the mutual relation of classes. He also applied his theoretical doctrine to 
the immense material to be collected by direct observation in the field 
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of zoology, physics, sociology. Indeed we must trace to him nearly all our 
special sciences, both the natural sciences, and those concerning the 
activities of the spirit of mankind. He is the origin of the striving 
towards an accurate analysis of each given situation which in the end has 
created modern European Science. We can see in the labours of his life, 
the first clear example of a philosophic intuition passing into a scientific 
method. 
Section III. This transition from philosophic intuition to scientific 
methods is in fact the whole topic of this chapter. A philosophic system, 
viewed as an attempt to coordinate all such intuitions, is rarely of any 
direct importance for particular sciences. Each such science in tracing its 
ideas backward to their basic notions stops at a half-way house. It finds 
a resting place amid notions which for its immediate purposes and for its 
immediate methods it need not analyse further. These basic notions are a 
specialization from the philosophic intuitions which form the background 
of the civilized thought of the epoch in question. They are intuitions 
which, apart from their use in science, ordinary language rarely 
expresses in any defined accuracy, but habitually presupposes in its 
current words and expressions. For example, the words 'tables', 'chairs', 
'rocks', presuppose the scientific notion of material bodies, which has 
governed natural science from the seventeenth century to the end of the 
nineteenth. 
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But, even from the point of view of the special sciences, philosophic 
systems with their ambitious aims at full comprehensiveness, are not 
useless. They are the way in which the human spirit cultivates its deeper 
intuitions. Such systems give life and motion to detached thoughts. Apart 
from these efforts at coordination, detached thoughts would flash out in 
idle moments, illuminate a passing phase of reflection, and would the 
perish and be forgotten. The scope of an intuition can only be defined by 
its coordination with other notions of equal generality. Even the 
discordance of competing philosophic systems is a factor essential for 
progress. The history of European thought, even to the present day, 
has been tainted by a fatal misunderstanding. It may be termed The 
Dogmatic Fallacy.  The error consists in the persuasion that we are 
capable of producing notions which are adequately defined in respect 
to the complexity of relationship required for their illustrations in 
the real world. Canst thou by searching describe the Universe? Except 
perhaps for the simpler notions of arithmetic, even our more familiar 
ideas, seemingly obvious, are infected with this incurable vagueness. Our 
right understanding of the methods of intellectual progress depends on 
keeping in mind this characteristic of our thoughts. The notions employed 
in every systematic topic require enlightenment from the perspective of 
every standpoint. They must be criticized from the standpoint of their 
own internal consistency within that topic, and from the standpoint of 
other topics of analogous generality, and from the standpoint of so-called 
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philosophic topics  with a wider range. During the medieval epoch in 
Europe, the theologians were the chief sinners in respect to dogmatic 
finality. During the last three centuries, their bad preeminence in this 
habit passed to the men of science. Our task is to understand how in fact 
the human mind can successfully set to work for the gradual definition of 
its habitual ideas.  It is a step by step process, achieving no triumphs of 
finality. We cannot produce that final adjustment of well-defined 
generalities which constitute a complete metaphysics. But we can produce 
a variety of partial systems of limited generality. The concordance of 
ideas within any one such system shows the scope and virility of the basic 
notions of that scheme of thought. Also the discordance of system with 
system, and success of each system as a partial mode of illumination, 
warns us of the limitations within which our intuitions are hedged. These 
undiscovered limitations are the topics for philosophic research. 
 
This doctrine of the limitations to which our best ideas are subject is 
illustrated by that very notion of material bodies which has just been 
mentioned. That notion is so obvious that it has haunted language so far 
as we can trace history backwards. Finally in the seventeenth century it 
was given a new precision for the purposes of physical science. Also 
physical science, thus re-conditioned, proved an overwhelming success 
for three centuries. It has transformed thought, and has transformed 
the physical activities of mankind. It seemed that at last mankind had 
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achieved the fundamental notion for all practical purposes, and that 
beyond it in the way of generality there lay mere aimless speculation. But 
in the twentieth century this great notion, as shaped for use by Galileo 
and Newton, has completely collapsed so far as concerns its use as a 
fundamental notion for physical science. In the modern science, it is a 
limited notion confined to special purpose. 
 
This collapse of nineteenth century dogmatism is a warning that the 
special sciences require that the imaginations of men be stored with 
imaginative possibilities as yet unutilized in the service of scientific 
explanation. The nearest analogy is to be seen in the history of some 
species of animal, or plant, or microbe, which lurks for ages as an obscure 
by-product of nature in some lonely jungle, or morass, or island. Then by 
some trick of circumstance it escapes into the outer world and 
transforms a civilization, or destroys an empire or the forests of a 
continent. Such is the potential power of the ideas which live in the 
various systems of philosophy. 
Of course in this action, and reaction, between science and 
philosophy either helps the other. It is the task of philosophy to 
work at the concordance of ideas conceived as illustrated in the 
concrete facts of the real world. It seeks those generalities which 
characterize the complete reality of fact, and apart from which any 
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fact must sink into an abstraction. But science makes the 
abstraction, and is content to understand the complete fact in 
respect to only some of its essential aspects. Science and Philosophy 
mutually criticize each other, and provide imaginative material for 
each other. A philosophic system should present an elucidation of 
concrete fact from which the sciences abstract. Also the sciences 
should find their principles in the concrete facts which a philosophy 
system presents. The history of thought is the story of the measure 
of failure and success in this joint enterprise. 
 
Section IV. Plato’s contribution to the basis notions connecting Science 
and Philosophy, as finally settled in the later portion of his life, has 
virtues entirely different from that of Aristotle, although of equal use 
for the progress of thought. It is to be found by reading together the 
Theaetetus, the Sophist, the Timaeus, and the fifth and tenth books of 
the Laws; and then by recurrence to his earlier work, the Symposium. He 
is never entirely self-consistent, and rarely explicit and devoid of 
ambiguity. He feels the difficulties, and expresses his perplexities. No 
one could be perplexed over Aristotle’s classifications; whereas Plato 
moves about amid a fragmentary system like a man dazed by his own 
penetration.  
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A few main doctrines stand out and they are of priceless importance for 
science, in the largest sense of that term. As to their coordination into a 
system, he is undogmatic and can only tell ‘the most likely tale’. Indeed, in 
his seventh Epistle (Cf.341, C.) he denounces the notion that a final 
system can be verbally expressed. His later thought circles round the 
interweaving of seven main notions namely, The Ideas, The Physical 
Elements, The Psyche, The Eros, The Harmony, The Mathematical 
Relations, The Receptacle. These notions are as important for us now, as 
they were then at the dawn of the modern world, when civilizations of 
the old type were dying. From their point of view the Athenians were 
right to condemn Socrates. After the coalescence of Greek and Semitic 
thought the old order of life was doomed. Western Civilization acquired a 
new intellectuality, clarified, humanized, moralized. 
 
Considering the Ideas by themselves, Plato points out that any selections 
are either compatible for joint exemplification, or are incompatible. It 
thus follows, as he notes, that the determinations of compatibilities and 
incompatibilities are the key to coherent thought, and to the 
understanding of the world in its function as the theatre for the 
temporal realization of ideas. The Aristotelian logic is only a specialized 
derivative from this general notion. 
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Plato then passes on to the agency whereby ideas obtain efficiency in the 
creative advance. As he conceives them in abstraction, he finds ideas to 
be static, frozen, and lifeless. They obtain ‘life and motion’ by their 
entertainment in a living intelligence. Such a living intelligence with its 
‘gaze fixed upon ideas’ was what Plato termed a Psyche, a word we can 
translate as ‘soul’. We must, however, be careful to divest the 
associations of the English word from the accretions due to centuries of 
Christianity. He conceives of a basic Psyche whose active grasp of ideas 
conditions impartially the whole process of the Universe. This is the 
Supreme Craftsman, on whom depends that degree of orderliness which 
the world exhibits. There is a perfection in this Psyche, which Plato finds 
out of his power to explain. There are also finite souls of varying grades, 
including human souls, all playing their part in conditioning nature by the 
inherent persuasiveness of ideas. 
 
But the notion of mere knowledge, that is to say, of mere understanding, 
is quite alien to Plato’s thought. The age of professors had not yet 
arrived. In his view, the entertainment of ideas is intrinsically associated 
with an inward ferment, an activity of subjective feeling, which is at once 
immediate enjoyment, and also an appetition which melts into action. This 
is Plato’s Eros, which he sublimates into the notion of the soul in the 
enjoyment of its creative function, arising from its entertainment of 
ideas. The word Eros means ‘Love’, and in The Symposium Plato gradually 
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elicits his final conception of the urge towards ideal perfection. It is 
obvious the he should have written a companion dialogue which might have 
been named The Furies, dwelling on the horrors lurking within imperfect 
realization.  
 
Plato, although he neglected to write this missing dialogue, did not 
overlook the confusion and disorder in Nature. He expressly denies 
omnipotence to his Supreme Craftsman. The influence of the 
entertainment of ideas is always persuasive, and can only produce such 
order as is possible. However, on this point he wavers, and sometimes 
writes as if the Craftsman were disposing the world according to his 
supreme will. 
The notion of an excellence, partly attained and partly missed, raises 
another problem which greatly exercised Greek thought at the time of 
Plato. The problem can take many special forms. In what does beauty 
consists, for example, the beauty of a musical melody, the beauty of a 
statue, or of a building such as the Parthenon? Also, there is that other 
form of beauty, which is rightness of conduct. Probably in this naïve 
shape, the question has no answer; since ‘The God’ is an ultimate 
qualification not to be analyzed in terms of any things more final than 
itself. But an analogous question can be asked, to which Greek thought 
was unanimous as to its answer. To what sort of things does the concept 
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of apply, and in particular what sort of conditions are requisite for its 
evocation?  The Greek answer to that latter pair of questions was that 
beauty belonged to composite things, and that the composition is 
beautiful when the many components have obtained in some sense the 
proper proportions. This was the Greek doctrine of Harmony, in respect 
to which neither Plato nor Aristotle ever waved.   
 
In respect to Harmony, the Greeks made a discovery which is a landmark 
in the history of thought. They found out that exact Mathematical 
Relationships, as they exist in Geometry and in the numerical proportions 
of measurements, are realized in various outstanding examples of 
beautiful composition. For instance Archytas discovered that, other 
circumstances being equal, the note given out by a stretched string 
depends on the length of the string, and that beautiful compositions of 
notes correspond to certain simple laws as to the proportional lengths of 
the strings. Also they investigated the dependence of the beauty of 
architecture upon the preservation of the proper proportions in the 
various dimensions. This was an immense discovery, the dependence of 
the qualitative elements in the world upon mathematical relations. The 
facts had gradually accumulated through thousands of years. The early 
Babylonians knew that the qualitative fact of the succession of seasons 
depended upon the lapse of definite numbers of days. In fact, they 
constructed very creditable calendars. But the Greeks, with their power 
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of generalization, grasped the full law of the interweaving of qualitative 
fact with geometrical and quantitative composition. They had the genius 
to be astonished. 
 
Plato drew the conclusion that the key to the understanding of the 
natural world, and in particular of the physical elements, was the study of 
mathematics. There is good reason to believe that the greater part of 
the studies of his Academy was devoted to mathematics. The 
mathematicians of the succeeding generation, and indeed of the next two 
hundred years, ending with the astronomers Ptolemy and Hipparchus, are 
the product of the systematic shaped by the example and the doctrine 
of Plato. Of course the Academy inherited the Pythagorean tradition of 
Mathematics. 
 
Thus with Plato and Aristotle, a new epoch commences. Science acquires 
the cleansing of logical and mathematical lucidity. Aristotle established 
the importance of scientific classification into species and genera; Plato 
divined the future scope of applied mathematics. Unfortunately, later on, 
the explicit development of Plato’s doctrines has been exclusively in the 
hands of religious mystics, of literary scholars, and of literary artists. 
Plato, the mathematician, for long intervals disappeared from the explicit 
Platonic tradition.  
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The notions of Harmony and of Mathematical Relations are only 
special exemplifications of a yet more general philosophic concept, 
namely, that of the general interconnectedness of things, which 
transforms the manifoldness of the many into the unity of the one. 
We speak in the singular of The  Universe , of Nature, of  φύσις phýsis  
which can be translated as Process. There is the one all-embracing fact 
which is the advancing history of the Universe. This community of the 
world, which is the matrix for all begetting, and whose essence is process 
with retention of connectedness, - this community is what Plato terms 
The Receptacle […]. In our effort to divine his meaning, we must 
remember that Plato says that it is an obscure and difficult concept, and 
that in its own essence the Receptacle is devoid of all forms. It is thus 
certainly not the ordinary geometrical space with its mathematical 
relations. Plato calls his Receptacle ‘The foster mother of all becoming’. 
He evidently conceived it as a necessary notion without which our analysis 
of Nature is defective. It is dangerous to neglect Plato’s intuitions. He 
carefully varies his phrases in referring to it, and implies that what he 
says is to be taken in its most abstract sense.  The Receptacle imposes a 
common relationship on all that happens, but does not impose what that 
relationship shall be. It seems to be a somewhat more subtle notion than 
Aristotle’s ‘matter’ which of course, is not the ‘matter’ of Galileo and 
Newton. Plato’s Receptacle may be conceived as the necessary community 
within which the course of history is set, in abstraction from all the 
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particular historical facts. I have directed attention to Plato’s doctrine 
of the Receptacle because, at the present moment, physical science is 
nearer to it than at any period since Plato’s death. The space-time of 
modern mathematical physics, conceived in abstraction from the 
particular mathematical formulae which applies to the happenings in it, is 
almost exactly Plato’s Receptacle. It is to be noted that mathematical 
physicists are extremely uncertain as to what these formulae are 
exactly, nor do they believe that any such formulae can be derived from 
the mere notion of space-time. Thus, as Plato declares, space-time in 
itself is bare of all forms.   
 
Section V. In the preceding sketch only one incidental generalization, 
selected from one topic comprised in the enormous labours of Aristotle’s 
life, has brought forward. Aristotle was at once a man of science, a 
philosopher, a literary critic, and a student of political theory. This 
particular classification of the things constitutive of the visible universe 
has been dwelt upon because it is an almost perfect example of a 
scientific induction satisfying all the conditions insisted on by the 
modern philosophy of science. It was a generalization from observed 
fact, and could be confirmed by repeated observation.. In its day – and 
its day lasted for eighteen hundred years – it was extremely useful; and 
now that it is dead, it is stone-dead, an archaeological curiosity. This is 
the fate of scientific generalizations, so long as they are considered in 
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relation to their strict scientific purpose. Towards the end of its long 
life, the doctrine lost its utility and turned into an obstructive agency. 
 
The Platonic group of notions which have been considered have none of 
the merits of the Aristotelian set. In fact, they are philosophic, and in 
the narrow sense are not scientific. They suggest no detailed 
observation. Indeed it has always been a reproach to Plato that he 
diverted interest from observation of the particular facts. So far as 
concerns political theory, and in particular jurisprudence, this accusation 
is certainly untrue, and arises from the habit of concentrating interest 
on his Dialogues in proportion to their literary brilliance. Nevertheless 
the assertion is undoubtedly true in respect to physical science. But Plato 
had another message. Where Aristotle said ‘observe’ and ‘classify’, the 
moral of Plato’s teaching is the importance of the study of mathematics. 
Of course, neither of them was so stupid as to dissuade from observation 
or, on the other hand, to deny the utility of mathematics. Probably 
Aristotle thought that the mathematical knowledge of his day was about 
as much as was wanted for the purpose of physical science. Any further 
progress could only minister to an unpractical curiosity about subtle 
abstractions. 
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An intense belief that a  knowledge of mathematical relations would 
prove the key to unlock the mysteries of the relatedness within Nature 
was ever at the back of Plato’s cosmological speculations. In one passage 
he reprobates the swinish ignorance of those who have failed to study 
the doctrine of proportions incapable of expression as numerical ratios. 
He evidently feels that the chance of some subtle elucidation of the 
nature of Harmony is being crassly lost. His own speculations as to the 
course of nature are all founded upon the conjectural application of some 
mathematical construction. So far as I can remember, in every case he 
made a sensible shot which, in fact, went wide of the mark.  
 
Although the Timaeus   was widely influential, yet for about eighteen 
hundred years after their epoch, it seemed that Aristotle was right and 
Plato wrong. Some mathematical formulae were interwoven with scientific 
ideas, but no more than would have been perfectly familiar to Aristotle 
apart from what were in his day the latest refinements. The cosmological 
scheme of the active scientists was in fact that of Aristotle. But Plato’s 
divination exemplifies another important function for philosophy. It 
evokes interest in topics as yet remote from our crude understanding of 
the interplay of natural forces. The science of the future depends for 
its ready progress upon the antecedent elucidation of hypothetical 
complexities of connections, as yet unobservable in nature. Plato’s 
mathematical speculations  have been treated as sheer mysticism by 
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scholars who follow the literary traditions of the Italian Renaissance. In 
truth, they are the products of genius brooding on the future of intellect 
exploring a world of mystery.  
 
Greeks, Egyptians, Arabs, Jews, and Mesopotamians advanced the science 
of mathematics beyond the wildest dreams of Plato. Unfortunately this 
side of Plato’s interest was notably absent among the Christian 
population. I believe it to be true that no Christian made any original 
contribution to mathematical science before the revival of science at the 
time of the Renaissance. Pope Silvester II – Gerbert, who reigned in the 
year 1000 A.D. – studied mathematics. But he added nothing. Roger Bacon 
proclaimed the importance of mathematics and named contemporary 
mathematicians. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the 
University of Oxford cherished mathematics. But none of these 
mediaeval Europeans advanced the subject. An exception must be made in 
favour of Leonardo of Pisa who flourished at the beginning of the 
thirteenth century. He was the first Christian to make an advance in the 
science which in his early history illustrates the cultural union of the 
Hellenistic Greeks with the Near East. But, subject to this qualification, 
sixteenth-century mathematics was entirely based upon non-Christian 
sources. Among the Christians mathematics and magic were confused. 
The Pope himself hardly escaped. We can hardly hope for a better 
illustration of the curious limitations of epochs and schools of civilization. 
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It is especially interesting in view of the dominant influence of Plato upon 
Christian thought. 
But the Platonic doctrine of the interweaving of Harmony with 
mathematical relations has been triumphantly vindicated. The 
Aristotelian classifications based upon qualitative predicates have a very 
restricted application apart from the introduction of mathematical 
formulae. Indeed Aristotelian logic, by its neglect of mathematical 
notions, has done almost as much harm as good for the advancement of 
science. We can never get away from the quotations: - How much, - In 
what proportions, - and In what pattern of arrangement with other 
things. The exact laws of chemical proportions make all the difference: 
CO will kill you, when  CO2  will only give you a headache. Also CO2 is a 
necessary element for the dilution of oxygen in the atmosphere; but too 
much or too little is equally harmful. Arsenic deals out either health or 
death, according to its proportions amid a pattern of circumstances. Also 
when the health-giving proportion of CO2  to free oxygen has been 
obtained, a re-arrangement of these proportional quantities of carbon 
and oxygen into carbon monoxide and free oxygen will provide a poisonous 
mixture. In Political Economy, the Law of Diminishing Returns points to 
the conditions for the maximum efficiency of a dose of capital. In fact, 
there is hardly a question to be asked which should not be fenced round 
with qualifications as how much, and as to what pattern of circumstances. 
Aristotelian logic, apart from the guardianship of mathematics, is the 
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fertile matrix of fallacies. It deals with propositional forms only adapted 
for the expression of high abstractions, the sort of abstractions usual in 
current conversation where the presupposed background is ignored. 
But it is evident that even the appeal to mathematics is too narrow, at 
least if mathematics is taken to mean those branches hitherto developed. 
The general science of mathematics is concerned with the investigation 
of patterns of connectedness, in abstraction from the particular relata 
and the particular modes of connection. It is only in some special 
branches of mathematics that notions of quantity and number are 
dominant themes. The real point is that the essential connectedness 
of things can never be safely omitted. This is the doctrine of the 
thoroughgoing relativity which infects the universe and which makes the 
totality of things as it were a Receptacle uniting all that happens. 
 
The Greek doctrine of Composition and Harmony has been vindicated by 
the progress of thought. Yet the vivid fancy of the Greeks was also apt 
to invest each factor in the Universe with an independent individuality, 
for example, the self-sufficient realm of ideas which dominated Plato’s 
earlier thought, and which intermittently intrudes into his later 
Dialogues. But we must not blame the Greeks for this excess of 
individualization. All language witnesses to the same error. We habitually 
speak of stones, and planets, and animals, as though each individual thing 
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could exist, even for a passing moment, in separation from an 
environment which is in truth a necessary factor in its own nature. Such 
an abstraction is a necessity of thought, and the requisite background of 
systematic environment can be presupposed. That is true. But it also 
follows that, in the absence of some understanding of the final nature of 
things, and thus of the sorts of backgrounds presupposed in such 
abstract statements, all science suffers from the vice that it may be 
combining various propositions which tacitly presuppose inconsistent 
backgrounds. No science can be more secure than the unconscious 
metaphysics which tacitly it presupposes. The individual thing is 
necessarily a modification of its environment, and cannot be 
understood in disjunction. All reasoning, apart from some metaphysical 
reference, is vicious. 
 
Section VI. Thus the Certainties of Science are a delusion. They are 
hedged around with unexplored limitations. Our handling of scientific 
doctrines is controlled by the diffused metaphysical concepts of our 
epoch. Even so, we are continually led into errors of expectation. Also, 
whenever some new mode of observational experience is obtained the old 
doctrines crumble into a fog of inaccuracies. 
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Our coordinated knowledge, which in the general sense of the term is 
Science, is formed by the meeting of two orders of experience. One 
order is constituted by the direct, immediate discriminations of 
particular observations. The other order is constituted by our general 
way of conceiving the Universe. They will be called, the Observational 
Order, and the Conceptual Order. The first point to remember is that 
the observational order is invariably interpreted in terms of the 
concepts supplied by the conceptual order. The question as to the 
priority of one or the other is, for the purpose of this discussion, 
academic. We inherit an observational order, namely types of things 
which we do in fact discriminate; and we inherit a conceptual order, 
namely a rough system of ideas in terms of which we do in fact interpret. 
We can point to no epoch in human history, or even in animal history, at 
which this interplay began. Also it is true that novel observations modify 
the conceptual order. But equally, novel concepts suggest novel 
possibilities of observational discrimination. 
 
The history of thought cannot be understood unless we take account of a 
grave weakness in the observational order. Observational discrimination 
is not dictated by the impartial facts. It selects and discards, and what 
it retains is rearranged in a subjective order of prominence. This order 
of prominence in observation is in fact a distortion of the facts. Thus we 
have to rescue the facts as they are from the facts as they appear. We 
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have to rescue the facts in the discard, and we have to discard the 
subjective order of prominence which is itself a fact of observation. For 
example, consider the observed facts in early stages of civilization. The 
observed fact was a flat Earth with the arched dome of the Sky. Even to 
the contemporaries of Pope Silvester the antipodes were inconceivable, 
and his reputed belief in them did not credit to the old wizard of a Pope.  
 
Again we view the sky at noon on a fine day. It is blue, flooded by the 
light of the Sun. The direct fact of observation is the sun as the sole 
origin of light, and the bare heavens. Conceive the myth of Adam and Eve 
in the Garden on the first day of human life. They watch the sunset, the 
stars appear: -'And, Lo!, creation widened to man's view'. 
 
The excess of light discloses facts and also conceals them. It distorts 
the facts for human observation. It is one task of speculation to urge 
observation beyond the boundaries of its delusive completeness, and to 
urge the doctrines of science beyond their delusive air of finality. 
 
We can now briefly characterize the history of the transformation of 
mediaeval cosmology into our modern standpoint. The effective agency in 
this transformation has a history of about eighteen hundred years 
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entirely divorced from physical observation. It is a history of abstract 
thought, namely of the development of mathematics. The interest, which 
was the motive in its development, was the interest in the coordination of 
theoretical notions and in the theoretical constructions arising from the 
domination of such notions. Yet, if many modern philosophers and men of 
science could have had their way, they would have been dissuading 
Greeks, Jews, and Muslims from such useless studies, from such pure 
abstractions for which no foresight could divine the ghost of an 
application. Luckily they could not get at their ancestors. 
Section VII. The services to mankind rendered by the Newtonian 
System of Nature are incalculable. It combines ideas derived from 
Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus, into a consistent scheme of thought  
which elucidates an incredible number of observed facts. Thereby it 
has enabled men to obtain a new command over Nature. Where we 
formerly obeyed, we now direct. But at last the Newton cosmology 
has broken down. 
The story of the breakdown extends over more than a century. For by 
far the greater part of that period men of science were quite unaware 
that the ideas which they were introducing, slowly, one after the other, 
were finally to accumulate into a body of thought inconsistent with the 
Newtonian ideas dominating their thoughts and shaping their modes of 
expression. The story commences with the wave-theory of light and ends 
with the wave-theory of matter. It finally leaves us with the philosophic 
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question, What are the concrete fact which exhibit this mathematical 
attribute of wave-vibration? 
The story in detail is the history of modern physics, which lies beyond 
the scope of this discussion. We merely require to understand the 
contrast between the most general notions respectively underlying 
Newtonian physics and modern physics. Newtonian physics is based upon 
the independent individuality of each bit of matter. Each stone is 
conceived as fully describable apart from any reference to any other 
portion of matter. It might be alone in the Universe, the sole 
occupant of uniform space. But it would still be that stone which it 
is. Also the stone could be adequately described without any 
reference to past or future. It is to be conceived fully and 
adequately as wholly constituted within the present moment. 
 
This is the full Newtonian concept, which bit by bit was given away, or 
dissolved, by the advance of modern physics. It is the thorough-going 
doctrine of 'simple location' and of 'external relations'. There was some 
divergence of opinion as to the external relations. Newton himself was 
inclined to construe them in terms of shock and of stress between 
contiguous bodies. But his immediate followers, such as Roger Cotes, 
added the notion of force at a distance. But either alternative was wholly 
and completely a fact in the present, namely, the fact of that external 
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relation between two bits of matter either contiguous or distant. The 
opposed doctrine of internal relations has been distorted by reason of 
its description in terms of language adapted to the presupposition of 
external relations of the Newtonian type. Even its adherents, such as 
F.H. Bradley for instance, fall into this pitfall. It must be remembered 
that just as the relations modify the natures of the relata, so the 
relata modify the nature of the relation. The relationship is not a 
universal. It is a concrete fact with the same concreteness as the 
relata. The notion of the immanence of the cause in the effect 
illustrates this truth. We have to discover a doctrine of nature which 
expresses the concrete relatedness of physical functionings and mental 
functionings, of the past with the present, and also expresses the 
concrete composition of physical realities which are individually diverse. 
 
Modern physics has abandoned the doctrine of Simple Location. The 
physical things which we term stars, planets, lumps of matter, 
molecules, electrons, protons, quanta of energy are each to be 
conceived as modifications of conditions within space-time, extending 
throughout its whole range. There is a focal region, which in common 
speech is where the thing is. But its influence streams away from it 
with finite velocity throughout the utmost recesses of space and time. 
Of course, it is natural, and for certain purposes entirely proper, to 
speak of the focal region, thus modified, as the thing itself situated 
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there. But difficulties arise if we press this way of thought to far. For 
physics, the thing itself is what is does, and what it does is this divergent 
stream of influence. Again the focal region cannot be separated from the 
external stream. It obstinately refuses to be conceived as an 
instantaneous fact. It is a state of agitation, only differing from the so-
called external stream by its superior dominance within the focal region. 
Also we are puzzled how to express exactly the existence of these 
physical things at any definite moment of time. For at every 
instantaneous point-event, within or without the focal region, the 
modification to be ascribed to this thing is antecedent to, or successive 
to, the corresponding modification introduced by that thing at another 
point-event. Thus if we endeavor to conceive a complete instance of 
existence of the physical thing in question, we cannot confine 
ourselves to one part of space or to one moment of time. The 
physical thing is a certain coordination of spaces and times and conditions 
in those spaces at times, this coordination illustrating one 
exemplification of a certain general rule, expressible in terms of 
mathematical relations. Here we have returned to a fundamental Platonic 
doctrine.  
 
Again, with the denial of simple location we must admit that within any 
region of space-time the innumerable multitude of these physical things 
are in a sense superposed. Thus the physical fact at each region of 
90 
 
 
space-time is a composition of what the physical entities throughout the 
Universe mean for that region. But a complete existence is not a 
composition of mathematical formulae, mere formulae. It is a concrete 
composition of things illustrating formulae. There is an interweaving of 
qualitative and quantitative elements. For example, when a living body 
assimilates food, the fact cannot be merely that one mathematical 
formula assimilates another mathematical formula. The fact cannot be 
merely that the equality of two and three with five assimilates the fact 
of the equality of thrice three with nine, nor can the number eleven 
assimilate the number sixteen. Any of these mathematical notions may be 
illustrated, but the fact is more than the formulae illustrated. 
 
Section VIII. The final problem is to conceive a complete [the Greek 
word for complete is often wrongly translated as absolute] fact. We can 
only form such a conception in terms of fundamental notions concerning 
the nature of reality. We are thrown back upon philosophy. Centuries ago 
Plato divined the seven main factors interwoven in fact: - The Ideas, The 
Physical Elements, The Psyche, The Eros, The Harmony, The 
Mathematical Relations, The Receptacle. All philosophical systems are 
endeavours to express the interweaving of these components. Of course, 
it is most unscholarly to identify our modern notions with these archaic  
thoughts of Plato. For us everything has a subtle difference. But for all 
these differences, human thought is now endeavouring to express 
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analogous elements in the composition of nature. It only dimly discerns, it 
misdescribes, and it wrongly associates. But always there remain the 
same beacons that lure. Systems, scientific and philosophic, come and go. 
Each method of limited understanding is at length exhausted. In its 
prime each system is a triumphant success: in its decay it is an 
obstructive  nuisance. The transition to new fruitfulness of 
understanding  are achieved  by recurrence to the utmost depths of 
intuition for the  refreshment of imagination . In the end – though there 
is no end – what is being achieved, is width of view, issuing in greater 
opportunities. But opportunity leads upwards or downwards. In unthinking 
Nature 'natural selection' is a synonym for 'waste'. Philosophy should 
now perform its final service. It should seek the insight, dim though it 
be, to escape the wide wreckage of a race of beings sensitive to values 
beyond those of mere animal enjoyment. 
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Chapter XV 
 
Philosophic Method 
 
Section I. In this final chapter of Part III my aim is a discussion of some 
methods which can usefully be employed in the pursuit of speculative 
philosophy. In illustration, and as a subsidiary aim, I shall refer to some 
doctrines of my own, [Process and Reality and Science and The Modern 
World], and to some comments upon them. In this chapter the transient 
aspect of nature will be mainly emphasized.  
 
So far as concerns methodology, the general issue of the discussion will 
be that theory dictates method, and that any particular method is only 
applicable to theories of one correlate species. An analogous conclusion 
holds for the technical terms. This close relation of theory to method 
partly arises from the fact that the relevance of evidence depends on 
the theory which is dominating the discussion. This fact is the reason 
why dominant theories are also termed 'working hypotheses'. 
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An example is afforded when we interrogate experience for direct 
evidence of the interconnectedness of things. If we hold with Hume, 
that the sole data originating reflective experience are impressions of 
sensation, and also if we also admit with him the obvious fact that no one 
such impression by its own individual nature discloses any information as 
to another such impression, then on that hypothesis the direct evidence 
for interconnectedness vanishes. Again, if we hold the Cartesian doctrine 
of substantial souls with many adventures of experience, and of 
substantial material bodies, then on that hypothesis the relations 
between two occasions of experience qualifying one soul are no evidence 
as to the connectedness of two such occasions respectively qualifying 
two different souls, and are no evidence as the connectedness of a soul 
and a material body, and are no evidence as to the connectedness of two 
occasions of agitation of one material body, or of two such occasions 
respectively belonging to different material bodies. But if we hold, as for 
example in Process and Reality, that all final individual actualities have 
the metaphysical character of occasions of experience, then on that 
hypothesis the direct evidence as to the connectedness of one's 
immediate present occasion of experience with one's immediately past 
occasions, can be validly used to suggest categories applying to the 
connectedness of all occasions in nature. A great deal of confused 
philosophical thought has its origin in obliviousness to the fact that the 
relevance of evidence is dictated by theory. For you cannot prove a 
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theory by evidence which that theory dismisses as irrelevant. This is also 
the reason that in any science which has failed to produce any theory 
with a sufficient scope of application, progress is necessarily very slow. 
It is impossible to know what to look for, and how to connect the 
sporadic observations. Philosophical discussion in the absence of a theory 
has no criterion of the validity of evidence. For example, Hume assumes 
that his doctrine of association holds for all types of impressions of 
sensation and of ideas of them indiscriminately. This assumption is part 
of his theory. In divorce from the theory, a separate appeal to 
experience is required for each type of impression, for example, tastes, 
sounds, sights, etc., and likewise, not only for the association of tastes 
inter se and of sounds inter se, but for the associations of tastes with 
sounds, and so on for every possible type, and for every possible 
conjunction of types.  
To sum up this preface, every method is a happy simplification. But 
only truths of a congenial type can be investigated by any one method, or 
stated in the terms dictated by the method. For every simplification is 
an over-simplification. Thus the criticism of a theory does not start from 
the question, True or false? It consists in noting its scope of useful 
application and its failure beyond that scope. It is an unguarded 
statement of a partial truth. Some of its terms embody a general notion 
with a mistaken specialization, and others of its terms are too general 
and require discrimination of their possibilities of specialization. 
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Section II. Philosophy is a difficult subject, from the day of Plato to the 
present time haunted by subtle perplexities. This existence of such 
perplexities arising from the common obviousness of speech is the reason 
why the topic exists. Thus the very purpose of philosophy is to delve 
below the apparent clarity of common speech. In this connection, it is 
only necessary to refer to Socrates. Another illustration is to be found in 
the Sophist, where Plato states that 'not-being' is a form of 'being'. 
This statement is at once an extreme instance of the breakdown of 
language, and the enunciation of a profound metaphysical truth which lies 
at the foundation of this discussion. 
 
Section III. Speculative Philosophy can be defined [Process and Reality 
Pt I, Ch. I, Sect I] as the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, 
necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of 
our experience can be interpreted. Here 'interpretation' means that 
each element shall have the character of a particular instance of the 
general scheme. 
 
Thus speculative philosophy embodies the method of the 'working 
hypothesis'. The purpose of this working hypothesis for philosophy is to 
coordinate the current expressions of human experience, in common 
speech, in social institutions, in actions, in the principles of the various 
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special sciences, elucidating harmony and exposing discrepancies. No 
systematic thought has made progress apart from some adequately 
general working hypothesis, adapted to its special topic. Such an 
hypothesis directs observation, and decides upon the mutual relevance of 
various types of evidence. In short, it prescribes method. To venture 
upon productive thought without such an explicit theory is to abandon 
oneself to the doctrines derived one's grandfather. 
 
In the preliminary stages of knowledge a haphazard criterion is all that is 
possible. Progress is then very slow, and most of the effort is wasted. 
Even an inadequate working hypothesis with some conformation to fact is 
better than nothing. It coordinates procedure. 
 
The advance of any reasonably developed science is twofold. There is the 
advance of detailed knowledge within the method prescribed by the 
reigning working hypothesis; and there is the rectification of the working 
hypothesis dictated by the inadequacies of the current orthodoxy. 
 
Sometimes it is necessary for a science to entertain concurrently two – 
or more – working hypotheses, each with its own success and its own 
failure. Such hypotheses are contradictory as stated; and science awaits 
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their conciliation by the production of a working hypothesis with a wider 
sweep. When a new working hypothesis is proposed, it must be criticized 
from its own point of view. For example, it is futile to object to the 
Newtonian dynamics that, on the Aristotelian system, the loose things on 
the earth's surface must be left behind by the earth's motion. 
Philosophy has been afflicted by the dogmatic fallacy, which is the 
belief that the principles of its working hypotheses are clear, obvious 
and irreformable. Then, as a reaction from this fallacy, it has swayed to 
the other extreme which is the fallacy of discarding method. 
Philosophers boast that they uphold no system. They are then a prey to 
the delusive clarities of detached expressions which it is the very 
purpose of their science to surmount. Another type of reaction is to 
assume, often tacitly, that if there can be any intellectual analysis it 
must proceed according to some one discarded dogmatic methods, and 
thence to deduce that intellect is intrinsically tied to erroneous fictions. 
This type is illustrated by the anti-intellectualism of Nietzsche and 
Bergson, and tinges American Pragmatism. 
 
Section IV. A method is a way of dealing with data, with evidence. What 
are the evidences to which philosophy appeals? 
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It is customary to contrast the objective approach of the ancient 
Greeks with the subjective approach of the moderns, initiated by 
Descartes and further emphasized by Locke and Hume. 
 
But whether we be ancient or modern, we can only deal with things, in 
some sense, experienced. The Greeks dealt with things that they thought 
they experienced, and Hume merely asked, what do we experience? This 
is exactly the question which Plato and Aristotle thought that they were 
answering.  
 
To speak of anything, is to speak of something which, by reason of that 
very speech, is in some way a component in that act of experience. In 
some sense or other, it is thereby known to exist. This is what Plato 
pointed out when he wrote, Not-being is itself a sort of being. 
 
Speech consists of noises, or visible shapes, which elicit an experience of 
things other than themselves. In so far as vocables fail to elicit a stable 
coordination of sound-character, or shape-character, to meaning, those 
vocables fail to function as speech. And in so far as some meaning is not 
in some sense directly experienced, there is no meaning conveyed. To 
point at nothing is not to point.  
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To speak of the same thing twice is to demonstrate that the being of 
that thing is independent of either singular act of speech, unless we 
believe that the two acts presuppose each other or are both presupposed 
by the thing spoken of. If we cannot speak of the same thing twice, 
knowledge vanishes taking philosophy with it. Thus, since speech can be 
repeated, things spoken of have a determined being in abstraction from 
the occasion of experience which includes that act of speech. 
The difference of ancients and moderns is that the ancients asked 
what have we experienced, and the moderns asked what can we 
experience. But in both cases, they asked about things transcending 
the act of experience which is the occasion of asking. 
 
Section V. The translation of Hume's question from "What do we 
experience' to What can  we experience' makes all the difference, 
though in his 'Treatise' Hume makes the transition, time and again, 
without explicit comment. For modern epistemology the latter form of 
the question - with its substitution of can  for do - is accompanied by the 
implicit presupposition of a method, namely that of placing ourselves in an 
introspective attitude of attention so as to determine the given 
components of experience in abstraction from our private way of 
subjective reaction, by reflection, conjecture, emotion, and purpose. 
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In this attitude of strained attention, there can be no doubt as to the 
answer. The data are the patterns of sensa provided by the sense organs. 
This is the sensationalist doctrine of Locke and Hume. Later, Kant has 
interpreted the patterns as forms introduced by the mode of reception 
provided by the recipient. Here Kant introduces the Leibnizian notion of 
the self-development of the experiencing subject. Thus for Kant the 
data are somewhat narrower than for Hume: they are the sensa devoid of 
their patterns. Hume's general analysis of the consequences of this 
doctrine stands unshaken. So also does his final reflection, that the 
philosophic doctrine fails to justify the practice of daily life. The 
justification of this procedure of modern epistemology is twofold, and 
both of its branches are based upon mistakes. The mistakes go back to 
the Greek philosophers. What is modern, is the exclusive reliance upon 
them. 
 
Section VI. The first error is the assumption of a few definite avenues 
of communication with the external world, the five sense-organs. This 
leads to the pre-supposition that the search for the data is to be 
narrowed to the question, what data are directly provided by the activity 
of the sense-organs - preferably the eyes. This doctrine of sense-organs 
has a vague, general truth, very important for practical affairs. In 
particular all exact scientific observation is derived from such data. The 
scientific categories of thought are obtained elsewhere. 
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But the living organ of experience is the living body as a whole. Every 
instability of any part of it – be it chemical, physical, or molar – imposes 
an activity of readjustment throughout the whole organism. In the 
course of such physical activities human experience has its origin. The 
plausible interpretation of such experience is that it is one of the natural 
activities involved in the functioning of such a high-grade organism. The 
actualities of nature must be so interpreted as to be explanatory of this 
fact. This is one desideratum to be aimed at in a philosophic scheme.  
Such experience seems to be more particularly related to the activities 
of the brain. But how far an exact doctrine can be based upon this 
presumption lies beyond our powers of observation. We cannot determine 
with what molecules the brain begins and the rest of the body ends. 
Further, we cannot tell with what molecules the body ends and the 
external world begins. The truth is that the brain is continuous with the 
body, and the body is continuous with the rest of the natural world. 
Human experience is an act of self-origination including the whole of 
nature, limited to the perspective of a focal region [Cf. Process and 
Reality  Pt. II, Ch. III, especially Sects. IV-XI, and Pt, Chs. IV and V.], 
located within the body, but not necessarily persisting in any fixed 
coordination with a definite part of the brain. 
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Section VII. The second error is the presupposition that the sole way of 
examining experience is by acts of conscious introspective analysis. Such 
a doctrine of the exclusive primacy of introspection is already 
discredited in psychology. Each occasion of experience has its own 
individual pattern. Each occasion lifts some components into primacy and 
retreats others into a background enriching the total enjoyment. The 
attitude of introspection shares this characteristic with all other 
experimental occasions. It lifts the clear-cut data of sensations into 
primacy, and cloaks the vague compulsions and derivations which form the 
main stuff of experience. In particular it rules out that intimate sense of 
derivation from the body, which is the reason for our instinctive 
identification of our bodies with ourselves.  
In order to discover some of the major categories under which we can 
classify the infinitely various components of experience, we must appeal 
to evidence relating to every variety of occasion. Nothing can be omitted, 
experience drunk and experience sober, experience sleeping and 
experience waking, experience drowsy and experience wide-awake, 
experience self-conscious and experience self-forgetful, experience 
intellectual and experience physical, experience religious and experience 
sceptical, experience anxious and experience care-free, experience 
anticipatory and experience retrospective, experience happy and 
experience grieving, experience dominated by emotion and experience 
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under self-restraint, experience in the light and experience in the dark, 
experience normal and experience abnormal. 
 
Section VIII. We have now reached the heart of our topic. What is the 
store-house of that crude evidence on which philosophy should base its 
discussion, and in what terms should its discussion be expressed? 
The main sources of evidence respecting this width of human experience 
are language, social institutions, and action, including thereby the fusion 
of the three which is language interpreting action and social institutions. 
Language delivers its evidence in three chapters, one on the meanings of 
words, another on the meanings enshrined in grammatical forms, and the 
third on meanings enshrined in grammatical forms, and the third on 
meanings beyond individual words and beyond grammatical forms, 
meanings miraculously revealed in great literature. 
 
Language is incomplete and fragmentary, and merely registers a stage 
in the average advance beyond ape-mentality. But all men flashes of 
insight beyond meanings already stabilized in etymology and grammar. 
Hence the role of literature, the role of the special sciences, and the 
role of philosophy: - in their various ways engaged in finding linguistic 
expressions for meanings as yet unexpressed. 
104 
 
 
As a special example, consider the line and a half of poetry in which 
Euripides [Trojan Women, 886-7] compresses the main philosophical 
problems which have tortured European thought from his day to the 
present: -”Zeus, whether thou are Compulsion of Nature or Intelligence 
of Mankind, to thee I prayed.” Consider the ideas involved. 'Zeus', 
'necessity [compulsion] of nature', 'intelligence of mankind', 'prayer'. 
These lines have survived the ages with a modern appeal vivid as when 
first they thrilled an Athenian audience. The biographer [Cf. John 
Morley's Life of Gladstone, Ch. X] of a modern statesman cites them to 
express the solemnity of the spectacle of life passing into religious 
emotion. 
 
Yet Hume would be able to find no 'impression of sensation' from which 
to derive 'Zeus', or 'compulsion', or 'intelligence', or the would-be 
'persuasiveness' which we term 'prayer'. John Morley himself selected 
the quotation in spite of his own positivist bias which should trivialize 
these meanings. Also, perhaps even for their original author, the lines 
represent a triumph of dramatic intuition over temperamental scepticism. 
 
The common practice, interpreted by the common language of mankind, 
tells the same tale. A statesman, or a president of a business 
corporation, assumes the 'compulsion of recent events' as laying down 
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inexorable conditions for the future. He frames a 'policy' upon this 
assumption and advises that it be 'acted on', thereby also assuming that 
the imposed conditions leave room for the effectiveness of 'choice' and 
'intelligence'. He assumes alternatives in contrast to the immediate fact. 
He conceives such ideals as effective in proportion as they are 
entertained. He praises and he blames by reason of this belief. 
 
In the world, there are elements of order and disorder, which thereby 
presuppose an essential interconnectedness of things. For disorder 
shares with order the common characteristic that they imply many things 
interconnected.  
 
Each experience enjoys a perspective apprehension of the world, and 
equally is an element in the world by reason of this very prehension, 
which anchors him to a world transcending his own experience. For, it 
belongs to the nature of this perspective derivation, that the world thus 
disclosed proclaims its own transcendence of that disclosure. To every 
shield, there is another side, hidden. 
 
Thus an appeal to literature, to common language, to common practice, at 
once carries us away from the narrow basis for epistemology provided by 
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the sense-data disclosed in direct introspection. The world within 
experience is identical with the world beyond experience, the occasion of 
experience is within the world and the world is within the occasion. The 
categories have to elucidate this paradox of the connectedness of 
things: - the many things, the one world without and within. 
 
Section IX. European philosophy is founded upon Plato's dialogues, which 
in their methods are mainly an endeavour to elicit philosophic categories 
from a dialectic discussion of the meanings of language taken in 
combination with shrewd observation of the actions of man and of the 
forces of nature. 
 
But in one dialogue, the Sophist, Plato explicitely considers the methods 
of philosophy. One of his conclusions is to point out the limitations of 
common speech. Mere dialectic, uncriticized is a fallacious instrument, 
the mark of the Sophist. For example, Plato insists that not-being is 
itself a form of being. Thus in philosophy linguistic discussion is a tool, 
but should never be a master. Language is imperfect both in its words 
and in its forms. Thus we discover two main errors to which philosophic 
method is liable, one is the uncritical trust in the adequacy of language, 
and the other is the uncritical trust in the strained attitude of 
introspection as the basis for epistemology. 
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But since the life-time of Plato nearly two and a half thousand years 
have intervened, including the continuous activity of European 
philosophic thought, pagan, Christian, secular. It is widely held that 
a stable, well-known philosophic vocabulary has been elaborated, and 
that in philosophic discussion any straying beyond its limits introduces 
neologisms, unnecessary and therefore to be regretted. 
 
This alleged fact requires examination. In the first place, if the 
allegation be true, it is very remarkable. It decisively places philosophy 
apart from the more special sciences. Modern mathematics, most secure 
and authoritative of sciences, is largely written in verbal and symbolic 
phrases which would have been unintelligible eighty years ago. In modern 
physics the old words, where they are still used, convey different 
meanings, and the new words are abundant. But it is futile to make a 
catalogue of the sciences accompanied by this refrain. The conclusion is 
obvious to the most cursory inspection. 
 
Section X. Undoubtedly, philosophy is dominated by its past literature to 
greater extent than any other science. And rightly so. But the claim that 
it has acquired a set of technical terms sufficient for its purposes, and 
exhaustive of its meanings, is entirely unfounded. Indeed its literature is 
so vast, and the variations of its schools of thought so large, that there 
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is abundant evidence of most excusable ignorance respecting verbal 
usages. 
 
A recent instance illustrates the vagueness of philosophical terminology. 
Logic is, by far, that branch of philosophy best systematized with the aid 
of stable technical language. Consider the terms Judgement and 
Proposition. I am not writing a preface to Logic, so I will confine myself 
to the assertion that there is considerable variation in the usages of 
these terms among logicians.  
 
Also we may well ask whether there are not subtle variations of meaning 
stretching far beyond the competence of the two-term vocabulary, - 
Judgement, Proposition. For example, Mr. Joseph [Cf. Mind, Vols. 36, 37, 
New Series] has been examining Mr. W.E. Johnson's use of the term 
Proposition in his well-known Logical Treatise. Mr. Joseph finds twenty 
distinct meanings. It is to be remembered that we are here referring to 
two of the most acute of modern logicians. Whether Mr. Joseph has 
rightly interpreted Mr. Johnson's phrases is not to the point. If Mr. 
Joseph has found twenty distinct, though allied, meanings closely 
connected with the term Proposition, there are twenty such meanings, 
even though for the moment their divergencies may seem unimportant to 
Mr. Johnson or Mr. Joseph. Importance depends on purpose and on point 
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of view. So at any moment twenty new terms may be required by some 
advance in the subtlety of logical theory. Again, if Mr. Johnson has 
employed twenty distinct meanings, it is because they were relevant to 
his argument, even though his argument may require further completion 
by reason of their unnoted distinction. 
 
It is safe to confirm that this situation can be repeated over every 
technical term in philosophy. 
Section XI. Another illustration, in which my use of the words [Cf. 
Science and Modern World, Ch. IV and passim and Process and Reality, 
Ch. II and passim] Prehension, Feeling, Satisfaction, is partly concerned, 
can be drawn from the terms expressive of the connectedness of things. 
For this topic, the reigning philosophical term is the word Relation. There 
are various controversies about relations which need not be explicitly 
referred to. But there is one discussion which illustrates our immediate 
topic. 
 
It is generally held that relations are universals, so that A can have the 
same relation to B as C has to D. For example 'loving', 'believing', 
'between', 'greater than', are relations. There can be no objection to 
this doctrine. For it is a mere definition. Universals which require two or 
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more particulars for their illustration need some term to indicate them, 
and Relation is the word chosen. 
 
But with this meaning to the term, a relation cannot signify the actual 
connectedness of the actual individual things which constitute the actual 
course of history. For example, New York les between Boston and 
Philadelphia. But the connectedness of the three towns is a real 
particular fact on the earth's surface involving a particular part of the 
eastern seaboard of the United States. It is not the universal 'between'. 
It is a complex actual fact which, among other things, exemplifies the 
abstract universal 'betweenness'. 
 
This consideration is the basis of Bradley's objection that relations do 
not relate. Three towns and an abstract universal are not three 
connected towns. A doctrine of connectedness is wanted. Bradley [Cf. 
Essays on Truth and Reality, Ch. Vi., On our Knowledge of Immediate 
Experience, Appendix, p. 193. The page references are to the Oxford 
edition of 1914. Also cf. Appendix to Ch. VI, passim, and Supplementary 
Note to the same.] writes 'Is there, in the end, such a thing as a relation 
which is merely between terms? Or, on the other hand, does not a 
relation imply an underlying unity and an inclusive whole?' 
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Bradley's 'inclusive whole' is the connectedness of which we are in 
search. Throughout this chapter [loc.cit.] Bradley uses the term Feeling 
to express the primary activity at the basis of experience. It is 
experience itself in its origin and with the minimum of analysis. The 
analysis of Feeling can never disclose anything lying beyond lying beyond 
the essence of the occasion of  experience. Hence Bradley terms it 'non-
relational'. There are of course grave differences between my own 
doctrine and that of Bradley. This was a reason [Cf. Process and Reality 
passim] for expounding my point of view in some independence of Bradley, 
with due acknowledgement. Surely the proper method of choosing 
technical terms is to adopt terms from some outstanding exposition of an 
analogous doctrine. It throws an interesting light on the belief in a well-
understood technical phraseology reigning in philosophy, that an  
accomplished philosopher censured in print, my use of the word Feeling as 
being in a sense never before employed in philosophy. 
I may add that William James also employs the word in much the same 
sense in his Psychology. For example in the first chapter he writes, 
"Sensation is the feeling of first things". And in the second chapter he 
writes, "In general, this higher consciousness about things is called 
Perception, the mere inarticulate feeling of their presence is Sensation, 
so far as we have it at all. To some degree we seem able to lapse into this 
inarticulate feeling at moments when our attention is entirely dispersed."  
It is interesting to make a few citations from Bradley, illustrating my 
112 
 
 
general adherence to his doctrine of Feeling, as expressed in his Chapter, 
"In my general feeling at any moment there is more than the objects 
before me, and no perception of objects will exhaust the sense of a living 
emotion"[Bradley, p. 159]. 
 
In accordance with this doctrine of Bradley's, I analyze a feeling [or 
prehension] into the 'datum', which is Bradley's 'living emotion', and into 
the 'subject' which is Bradley's 'me'. My reason for using the term 
'subjective form', is that I stretch its meaning beyond 'emotion'. For 
example consciousness, if it be present, is an element in the subjective 
form. This is, of course, a grave divergence from Bradley. Subjective 
form is the character assumed by the subject by reason of some 
prehended datum. 
But on the whole I conform to Bradley's conception of the function of 
subjective form. For example, "These puzzles are insoluble unless that 
which I feel, and which is not an object before me, is present and active. 
This felt element is used and it must be used in the constitution of that 
object which satisfies me"[p. 161].  
 
From my point of view there is an ambiguity in this statement, but I 
adhere to either alternative meaning. 
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The component of feeling 'which is not an object before me' is the 
subjective form. If Bradley is stating that the subjective forms of 
feelings determine the process of integration, I entirely agree. The 
result, as Bradley states, is the 'satisfaction' which is the final feeling 
terminating the unrest of the creative process. 
Bradley, however, may mean by his phrase "that which I feel, and which is   
not an object before me" what I terme a "negative prehension". Such a 
prehension is active via its contribution of its subjective form to the 
creative process, but it dismisses its 'object' from the possibility of 
entering into the datum of the final satisfaction. This final complex 
datum will be what Bradley calls "that object that satisfies me". Again I 
agree. 
 
The doctrine of the 'living emotion' which necessarily clothes each 
concrete exhibition of the subject-object situation is far older than 
Bradley. We find its germ in Plato, who insists that the whole character 
is conformed to the adequate knowledge. He implicitly refuses to 
abstract the 'living emotion' from the bare intellectual perception, and 
thereby identifies virtue with knowledge. The advance in psychology has 
added to our conscious discrimination, but it has not altered the fact 
that inevitably perception is clothed with emotion. 
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The historical importance of the doctrine is stated by George Foot 
Moore: [In the Prefatory Note to Emotion as the Basis of Civilization, by 
J.H. Denison, New York, 1928 (Scribner's): a work of importance.] - 
"Civilization develops only where considerable numbers of men work 
together for common ends. Such unity is brought about, not so much by 
community of bare ideas as by community of the feelings by which ideas 
are 'emotionalized' and become beliefs and motives." 
 
The conventionalized abstractions prevalent in epistemological theory are  
very far from the concrete facts of experience. The word 'feeling' has 
the merit of preserving this double significance of subjective form and 
of the apprehension of an object. It avoids the disjecta  membra 
provided by abstraction. [The genetic description of the process of 
'emotionalization' is considered in my 'Symbolism, Its Meaning and 
Effect' and also in Process and Reality Pt. II, Ch. VIII and throughout 
Pt. III.] 
 
Section XII. Thus an occasion of human experience is one illustration of 
the required doctrine of connectedness. 
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Bradley's authority can be quoted in support. He writes: [Loc. cit., p. 175] 
"At every moment my stage of experience, whatever else it is, is a whole 
of which I am immediately aware. It is an experienced 'non-relational' 
unity of many in one." Here Bradley by 'non-relational' apparently means 
that experience is not a relation of an experient to something external to 
it, but is itself the 'inclusive whole' which is the required connectedness 
of 'many in one'. 
In this I thoroughly agree, holding that the connectedness of things is 
nothing else than the togetherness of things in occasions of experience. 
Of course, such occasions are only rarely occasions of human experience. 
 
Curiously enough Hume also agrees. For his only togetherness of the 
stream of impressions of sensation, which in his doctrine are distinct 
existences at distinct times, lies in the 'gentle force' of association 
which must lie wholly within an occasion of experience. This is also one 
aspect of Kant's doctrine, that the occasions of experience provide the 
forms of connectedness. 
Of course there are important differences between all these doctrines. 
But they agree in their general principle - to look on occasions of 
experience as the ground of connectedness. 
Section XIII. Also Leibniz can find no other connectedness between 
reals except that lying wholly within the individual experiences of the 
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monads, including the Supreme Monad. He employed the terms 
'perception' and 'apperception' for the lower and higher way in which one 
monad can take account of another, namely for ways of awareness. But 
these terms are too closely allied to the notion of consciousness which in 
my doctrine is not a necessary accompaniment. Also they are entangled in 
the notion of representative perception which I reject. But there is the 
term [This term is used by L.T. Hobhouse, Theory of Knowledge, Ch I and 
developed] 'apprehension' with the meaning of 'thorough understanding'. 
Accordingly, on the Leibnizian model, I use the term 'prehension' for the 
general way in which the occasion of experience can include as part of its 
own essence, any other  entity, whether another occasion of experience 
or an entity of another type. This term is devoid of suggestion either of 
consciousness or of representative perception. Feelings are the positive 
type of prehension. In positive prehensions the 'datum' is preserved as 
part of the final complex object which 'satisfies' the process of self-
formation and thereby completes the occasion. 
This nomenclature has been made up to conform to the condition, 
that, as a theory develops, its technical phraseology should grow out 
of the usages of the great masters who laid its foundations. The 
immediate verbal usages at any moment prevalent in any school of 
philosophy are but a small selection from the total vocabulary of the 
philosophic tradition.  This is rightly the case having regard to the 
variations of doctrine.  
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The current usage can express the doctrine of the reigning school of 
thought and of certain accredited variations from it. The demand 
that an alternative doctrine with other roots in the historic tradition 
should confine itself to this selection of terms amounts to the 
dogmatic claim that certain preliminary assumptions should never be 
revised. Only those schools of thought are to be allowed which can 
be expressed in the sacred terms. What can reasonably be asked, is 
that each doctrine should ground its vocabulary on its own proper 
tradition. If this precaution has been taken, an outcry as to 
neologisms is a measure of unconscious dogmatism. 
 
Section XIV. The main method of philosophy in dealing with its 
evidence is that of descriptive generalization. Social institutions 
exemplify a welter of chraracteristics. No fact is merely such-and-
such. It exemplifies many characters at once, all rooted in the 
specialities of its epoch. Philosophic generalization seizes on those 
characters of abiding importance, dismissing the trivial and the 
evanescent. There is an ascent from a particular fact, or from a 
species, to the genus exemplified. 
 
It is to be noted that the converse procedure is impossible. There can be 
no descent from a mere genus to a particular fact, or to a species. For 
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facts and species are the product of the mingling of genera. No genus in   
own essence indicates the other genera with which it is compatible. For 
example, the notion of a backbone does not indicate the notions of 
suckling the young or of swimming in water. Thus no contemplation of the 
genus vertebrate, taken by itself, can suggest mammals or fishes, even as 
abstract possibilities. Neither the species nor the instance are to be 
discovered by the genus alone, since both include forms not 'given' by 
the genus. A species is a potential mingling of genera, and an individual 
instance involves, among other things, an actual mingling of many species. 
A syllogism is a scheme for demonstration of ways of mingling. 
 
Thus the business of Logic is not the analysis of generalities but their 
mingling. [Cf. Plato's Sophist, 253] 
 
Philosophy is the ascent to the generalities with the view of 
understanding their possibilities of combination. The discovery of new 
generalities thus adds to the fruitfulness of those already known. It lifts 
into view new possibilities of combination. 
 
Section XV. Even the dim apprehension of some great principle is apt 
to clothe itself with tremendous emotional force. The welter of 
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particular actions arising out of such complex feelings with their core 
of deep intuition are in primitive times often brutish and nasty. 
Finally civilized language provides a whole group of words, each 
embodying the general idea under its own specialization. If we desire 
to reach the generality common to these various specializations, we 
must gather together the whole group of words with the hope of 
discerning their common element. This is a necessary procedure for 
the purpose of philosophical generalization. The premature use of one 
familiar word inevitably limits the required generalization by importing 
the familiar special connotation of that word. 
For example, [Cf. Process and Reality passim, where the second of the 
doctrines stated below is developed.] let the working hypothesis be that 
the ultimate realities are the events in their process of origination. Then 
each event, viewed in its separate individuality, is a passage between two 
ideal termini, namely, its components in their ideal disjunctive diversity 
passing into the same components in their concrete togetherness. There 
are two current doctrines as to this process. One is that of the external 
Creator, eliciting this final togetherness out of nothing. The other 
doctrine is that it is a metaphysical principle, belonging to the nature of 
things, that there is nothing in the Universe other than instances of this 
passage and components of these instances. Let this latter doctrine be 
adopted. Then the word Creativity expresses the notion that each event 
is a process issuing in novelty. Also if guarded in the phrases Immanent 
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Creativity, or Self-Creativity, it avoids the implication of a transcendent 
Creator. But the mere word Creativity suggests Creator, so that the 
whole doctrine acquires an air of paradox, or of pantheism. Still it does 
convey the origination of novelty. The word Concrescence is a derivative 
from the familiar Latin verb, meaning 'growing together'. It also has the 
advantage that the participle 'concrete' is familiarly used for the notion 
of complete physical reality. Thus Concrescence is useful to convey the 
notion of many things acquiring complete complex unity. But it fails to 
suggest the creative novelty involved. For example, it omits the notion of 
the individual character arising in the concrescence of the aboriginal 
data. The event is not suggested as 'emotionalized', that is, as with its 
'subjective form'. 
 
Again the term 'together' is one of the most misused terms in 
philosophy. It is a generic term illustrated by an endless variety of 
species. Thus its use as though it conveyed one definite meaning in 
diverse illustrations is entirely sophistical. Every meaning of 'together' 
is to be found in various stages of analysis of occasions of experience. No 
things are 'together' except in experience; and no things 'are', except 
as components in experience or as immediacies of process which are 
occasions in self-creation. 
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Section XVI. Thus to arrive at the philosophic generalization which is the 
notion of a final actuality conceived in the guise of a generalization of an 
act of experience, an apparent redundancy of terms is required. The 
words correct each other. We require 'together', 'creativity', 
'concrescence', 'prehension', 'feeling', 'subjective form', 'data', 
'actuality', 'becoming', 'process'. 
 
Section XVII. At this stage of the generalization a new train of thought 
arises. Events become and perish. In their becoming they are immediate 
and then vanish into the past. They are gone; they have perished; they 
are no more and have passed into not-being. Plato terms [Cf. Timaeus] 
them things that are 'always becoming and never really are'. But before 
he wrote this phrase, Plato had made his great metaphysical 
generalization, a discovery which forms the basis of his present 
discussion. He wrote in the Sophist, not-being is itself a form of being. 
He only applied the same doctrine to his eternal forms. He should have 
applied the same doctrine to the things that perish. He would then have 
illustrated another aspect of the method of philosophic generalization. 
When a general idea has been obtained, it should not be arbitrarily 
limited to the topic of its origination. 
In framing a philosophic scheme, each metaphysical notion should be 
given the widest extension of which it seems capable. It is only in this 
122 
 
 
way that the true adjustment of ideas can be explored. More important 
even that Occam's doctrine of parsimony – if it be not another aspect of 
the same – is this doctrine that the scope of a metaphysical principle 
should not be limited otherwise than by the necessity of its meaning. 
Thus we should balance Aristotle's – or, more rightly, Plato's – doctrine 
of becoming by a doctrine of perishing. When they perish, occasions pass 
from the immediacy of being into the not-being of immediacy. But that 
does not mean that they are nothing. They remain 'stubborn fact': - 
Pereunt et imputantor. 
The common expressions  of mankind fashion the past for us in three 
aspects, - Causation, Memory, and our active transformation of our 
immediate past experience into the basis of our present modification of 
it. Thus 'perishing' is the assumption of a role in a transcendent future. 
The not-being of occasions is their 'objective immortality'. A pure 
physical prehension is how an occasion in its immediacy  of being absorbs 
another occasion which has passed into the objective immortality of its 
not-being. It is how the past lives in the present. It is causation. It is 
memory. It is perception of derivation. It is emotional conformation to a 
given situation, an emotional continuity of past with present. It is a basis 
element from which springs the self-creation of each temporal occasion. 
Thus perishing is the initiation of becoming. How the past perishes is how 
the future becomes.” [End of  Chapter XV, Philosophic Method] 
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Appendix 4.  
Albert Einstein. 
“Physics really began with the invention of mass, force, and an inertial 
system. These concepts are all free inventions. They led to the 
mechanical point of view. For the physicist of the early nineteenth 
century, the reality of our outer world consisted of particles with simple 
forces acting between them and depending only on the distance. He tried 
to retain as long as possible his belief that he would succeed in explaining 
All events in nature by these fundamental concepts of reality. The 
difficulties connected with the deflection of the magnetic needle, the 
difficulties connected with the structure of the ether, induced us to 
create a more subtle reality. The important invention of the 
electromagnetic field appears. A courageous scientific imagination was 
needed to realize fully that not the behaviour of bodies, but the 
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behaviour of something between them, that is, the field, may be essential 
for ordering and understanding events”(…) “What impresses our senses 
as matter is really a great concentration of energy into a comparatively 
small space”(Albert Einstein / L. Infeld. (1938) The Evolution of Physics. 
London: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 257, 311-312 ). 
 
Appendix 5. 
To quote Gioberti again: 'The mean between two or more things, their 
juncture, union, transit, passage, crossing, interval, distance, bond and 
contact – all these are mysterious, for there are rooted in the continuum, 
in the infinite. The interval that runs between one idea and another, one 
thing and another, is infinite, and can only be surpassed by the creative 
act. This is why the dynamic moment and dialectic concept of the mean  
are no less mysterious than those of the beginning and the end. The mean 
is a union of two diverse and opposite things in a unity. It is an essentially 
dialectic concept, and involves an apparent contradiction, namely, the 
identity of the one and the many, of the same and the diverse. This unity 
is simple and composite; it is unity and synthesis and harmony. It shares 
in two extremes without being one or the other...”. (Paolo Zellini, A Brief 
History of Infinity, Penguin Books London1980, page 53) 
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7.  Notes 
[1] See Appendix 1 for the term pratityasamutpada in Eastern and 
Western modes of thought. 
[2] Lindtner, C. Nagarjuniana: Studies in the writings and philosophy of 
Nagarjuna. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 2002. It is worth noting, 
however, that Tilmann Vetter has raised doubts about the authenticity 
of one of Nagarjuna's works in: On the Authenticity of the Ratnavali. 
Asiatische Studien XLVI, 1992. pp. 492-506. For two well-known 
translations of MMK see: Kalupahana, D. J. Mulamadhyamakakarika 
Nagarjuna: The philosophy of the middle way. New Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass. 1999; Garfield, J. L. The fundamental wisdom of the middle 
way: Nagarjuna's 'Mulamadhyamakakarika'. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 1996. 
[3] I use the expression 'body' synonymously with 'object' or 'particle' 
or 'field' or 'system' or 'entity'. 
[4] Cf. Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition, The 
World Publishing Company, New York and Cleveland. 1968. p. 669 
[5] See: Gadamer, H.-G.. Der Anfang des Wissens. Phillip Reclam jun. 
Stuttgart 1999, p.35. Cf. Davies, P.C.W.  and Brown, J.R. The Ghost in the 
Atom. Cambridge, University Press, 1986. 
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[6] Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition, The World 
Publishing Company, New York and Cleveland. 1968. 
[7] Cf. Bohm, D. Wholeness and the implicate Order. London: Routledge 
Classics. 2000. 
[8] Cf. Davidson, D. The myth of the subjective. In: Davidson, D., 
Subjective, intersubjective, objective. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 1988 (my own translation from German). 
[9] Zeilinger, A. Interview in the German newspaper Tagesspiegel 20th of  
December 1999 (my own translation). Steven Hawkings is defending a 
very similar position. He says: “I, on the other hand, am a positivist who 
believes that physical theories are just mathematical models we 
construct, and that it is meaningless to ask if they correspond to reality, 
just whether they predict observations”. Penrose, R. The Large, the 
Small and the Human Mind.  In M.  Longair (Ed.),  The Objections of an 
Unashamed Reductionist. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2000, 
p. 169. It is not meaningless to ask about the correspondence between a 
model and object, because if a model is correct then it has structural 
similarities with the phenomena that it is reconstructing; otherwise it 
can lead to predictions for which there are no meaningful physical 
explanation, because they have no correspondence to experimental data. 
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[10] Garfield, J. L. The fundamental wisdom of the middle way: 
Nagarjuna's 'Mulamadhyamakakarika' (MMK). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 1996, page 3. 
[11] See: Lindtner, C. op.cit., pp. 109 and 113. 
[12] Images, metaphors, allegories or symbolic examples, analogical ideas, 
have a freshness which rational ideas do not possess. The starting point 
of the MMK is the double nature of phenomena. These fundamental two-
body systems cannot be further divided analytically. The two bodies 
constitute a system of two material or immaterial components which 
complement each other. One of the components cannot exist without the 
other; each one forms the counterpart of the other. 
[13] Tarab Tulku Rinpoche. UD-Newsletter N. 4, January 2006. Rabten, 
Geshe. Mahamudra. Der Weg zur Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit. Le Mont 
Pélèrin. 2002. Keown, D.. A Dictionary of Buddhism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 2003. 
[14] See: Rock, I. Perception. New York: H.W. Freeman & Company. 1995. 
[15] Einstein, A. &  Infeld, L. The Evolution of Physics. London: Cambridge 
University Press. 1938. pp. 257, 311/312. 
[16] The term entanglement is explained in the Appendix 2. 
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[17] Einstein, Albert. Quantenmechanik und Wirklichkeit, 'Dialectica 2',        
1948. pp. 320-324. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1746-
8361.1948.tb00704.x/pdf. 
[18] Niels Bohr says: “I do not know what quantum mechanic is. I think we 
are dealing with some mathematical methods which are adequate for 
description of our experiments” (Collected Works. Volume 6, Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Science Publishers. 1985, p. 103). 
[19] “The most convenient context for investigating the forces of nature 
is a system of two objects bound together by mutual attraction. The 
earth and the moon, for example, constitute the most readyly accessible 
system in which to observe the gravitational force. The hydrogen atom, 
consisting of an electron and a proton, has long been an essential testing 
ground for theories of the electromagnetic force. The deuterion, made 
up of a proton and a neutron, represents a model system for studies of 
the forces in the atomic nucleus. Now there is a bound system in which to 
investigate the force that acts between quarks, the constituents of 
protons, neutrons and many related particles. The system is called 
quarkonium, and it consists of a heavy quark bound to an equally massive 
antiquark. The force at work in quarkonium is the strongest one known; it 
has come to be called the color force, and it is now thought to be the 
basis of all nuclear forces. Of the various two-body systems the simplest 
in some respects is the artificial atom called positronium” (Bloom, E. D. & 
Feldman, G. J. Quarkonium. Scientific American, 246, 5, 1982, pp. 42-53) 
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[20] Weinberg, S. Unified theories of elementary-particle interaction. 
Scientific American, 231, 1, 1974,  pp. 50-59. 
[21] Friedman, D. Z.  & Nieuwenhuizen, P. van. Supergravity and the 
unification of the laws of physics. Scientific American, 238, 2, 1978, pp. 
126-143. 
[22] 'T Hooft, G. Symmetrien in der Physik der Elementarteilchen. In: 
Dosch, H. G. (Ed.): Teilchen, Felder und Symmetrien. Heidelberg: 
Spektrum. 1995, pp. 40-57 (my own translation). 
[23] Rebbi, C. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. September 5th, 2001 (my 
own translation). 
[24] Cf. Heisenberg, W. Der Teil und das Ganze, München 1969, p. 141. 
Weizsäcker, C.F. von  Ein Blick auf Platon. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam 
Junior. 1981, p.134. Schopper, H. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. May 
5th, 1999. 
[25] Nagarjuna, Catuhstava. Hymn to the Buddha. In: Lindtner, C. 
Nagarjuniana. New Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass. 1982. p. 135. 
[26] Farrow, G.W. & Menon, I. The concealed Essence of the Hevajra 
Tantra. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 2001. p. 10. 
[27] Penrose, R. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 2000. p. 66. 
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[28] Einstein, A. & Infeld, L. The Evolution of Physics. London: Cambridge 
University Press. 1938, pp. 311-312. 
[29] Gioberti, V. Della Protologia. Vol. 1. Náples:  1864, p. 160. In: Zellini, 
P. A brief History of Infinity. London: Penguin Books. 2005, p. 53. 
[30] Clegg, B. The strange world of quantum entanglement. California 
Literary Review. March 20th, 2007. http://www.calitreview.com/51 
accessed on October 2011. 
[31] Merali, Z. Quantum effects brought to light: Results of 
entanglement made visible to human eyes. Nature news. April 28th, 2011. 
Doi:10.1038/news.2011.252. 
http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110428/full/news.2011.252.html 
accessed on October 2011. 
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